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om P. MTI-ZELPLN,
P.e.
2 13 N. Street
Coew d' Alene, Idaho 838 14
Tele: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISB# 6083

IN THE DISTMCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTmCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHIO, ICN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENM

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS P. LAV?RE??CE and
BRENDA J. LAV?RENCE, Husband
and Wife

1
1

CASE NO. CV-02-07671

)

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS
LA
NCE IN SUPPORT OF
OPPOSITION TO E N E W D
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
)

1

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO

1
) ss.

County of Kootenai

1

I, Douglas P. Lawrence, after being duly sworn upon my oath, depose and say:

1. I make this Afiidavit of my own personal knowledge. 1 am over the age of 18. I am
knowledgeable of the facts and issues regarding this matter and am competent to testify to the
facts contained in this affidavit. It is true and conect to the best of my knowledge.

2. My wife and I purchased the property which is the subject of this complaint in July 1996.
We have now owned the subject property for over eleven years. During the time that we have

been in possession of this properb-y, I have made comtless visits to the subject properhy for
puposes of gathering firewood, logging, repairing gates, posting signs, photograpf?y, cmping,
repairing vanddism and d m a g e to propeq, clearing roads, recreational uses, etc. I have made
numerous explorations thoughout the south half of Section 2 1, the west half of Section 22, and
the Southwest quarter of Section 15. I m very familiar with the trails and roads that exist in the
above described area.

3. My wife and I were sued in 1998 by North American Cellular over the Apple Blossom
Road as it crosses our proper@. Since then, we have also been sued by AT&T, Kootenai Electric,
Verizon, Capstar, and Nextel; all for the same reasons. Because of these lawsuits, I have had to
perform hours of research at the Kootenai County Recorders Office; personally researching all
the deeds, titles, and conveyances regarding the subject property as well as the plaintiffs
property. I have personally reviewed every track sheet as well as every recorded instrument for
the above described land. I have reviewed every land conveyance since the issuance of the
original land patent signed by President William Howard Taft over 100 years ago. I have also
reviewed the historical records regarding Signal Point and Mellick Roads. I have reviewed every
Conditional Use Permit and building permit that the Kootenai County Planning and Zoning
Department has issued for the Southwest quarter of Section 22 since the institution of zoning
laws in Kootenai County. I have also personally met with and made inquiries of employees of
Idaho Forest Industries, Wilber Mead, John Mack, Harold Funk and a Licensed Surveyor
regarding the historical use of the road. Recently, I was present at the deposition of Harold Funk,
J o h Rook, and Capstar. H do not believe any other person living has invested as much time,
energy, or expense in studying t h s road or can speak with the sane authoritgi.
4. At the time Harold Funk purchased his land, he had a legal ingress/egress to his land via

Me'llick road as it crossed his land in Section 15 A private road that Harold Funk identif ed as a
logging road in his deposition, extended from MelEick Road, through Section 22 and joined into
Apple Blossom Road2.

5. The public records reveal that neither Harold Funk nor h s predecessors in interest in the
lands he o w e d ever obtained a legal in~ess/egressto Signal Point road across the road now
identified as Apple Blossom Road. There are no records to indicate that Pike Reynolds or the
Radens and Marcoes used any other ingresslegress other than Mellick Road.
6. GTE built the first structure in the southwest quarter of Section 22 on or about 1966.
Public records reveal that GTE did obtain a right of way to Signal Point road in 1966. The right
of ways that GTE obtained, only benefited the land that GTE had acquired. These right of ways
did not benefit any other lands.
7. The Funks purchased the land laying in Sections 15,2 1, and 22 on or about 19693. From
1969 until the Funks sold the subject property to H m a n Synergistics in 1975, they used the
Apple Blossom road a couple of times per year for a total of 20-30 times over an approximately
six year period4. Furthermore, when the Funks did use the road, they used it to access their
property in the Southwest quarter of Section 21 and only rarely did they use it to cross the
Defendants' land5.

8. Harold F d moved to AlberdeerdArnerican Falls in 1975 and for all practical purposes,
h s use of the road ceased6. From 1975 until he sold his last remaining interest in his land to John
Mack in 1992, a period spanning some 17 years, he made only a total of 2-3 visits to his land in
Section 227.

9. Hmold FLU&conveyed the Defendmts' land to Human Synergistics Witbln a f e months
~
of moving hmself to Alberdeeri'American Falls8. Mrs. Funk moved away from the area in the

spring of 197G9. There i s no evidence that bbs. Funk ever drove to their properly herself.

B 0. Prior to the creation of the Defendant" parcel, the only land s m e r s in the Southwest
qumer of Section 22 were GTE and the F d s . There were no other land o w e r s and GTE had
the only structure. GTE w s the only enti.ty using the road as it crossed the Defendants' land on a
regular basis and they were the only Iand o m e r with an easement to S i p a l Point road.
l 1, m e n Harold F d sold the Defendmts' laad to H m a n Synergistics, the land did not
have a legal ingresslegess to Signal Point road. It did not have a liegal ingresslegress when

Ifman Synergistics sold it to the Johnsons and McHughs in May 1976. The severance of the
Defendants' land from the original FLU&estate did not cause the retained lands to be separated
from the highway and did not cause a necessity.
12. In July 1976, the Johnsons and McHughs did obtain a legal ingresslegress to Signal
Point roadi0.This easement only benefited their land and did not benefit the lands still owned by
the Funks in Section 22". When the Johnsons and Mcf-lughs obtained this easement, the only
other entity using the road was GTE as the Funks were living in Alberdeedherican Falls by
tlus timei2.
13. There is no evidence that the Funks intended to make pemanent, any use across the
Defendants' land. The Funks only drove across the Defendants' land a couple of times. And, had
they intended the use to be permanent, the Funks would have obtained the necessary easements
across the other lands so they had a legal ingresslegress from the Defendants' land to Signal
Point road.
14. The Funks pwchased an easement from Wilber Mead in order to access their land lying

in the Southwest quarter of Section 2 1". This fact is supported by Harold Funk's o w "lstimonjr

in his deposition, together with the language which was used to create the easement which states:

"Easementfor ingress and egress over existing road to andporn ~Wicvowavestation lying utilhin

15. The plaintiff has offered no evidence to show that they benefit &om any easement
across any of the other lands they must traverse to reach Signal Point road.

16. l drove my personal vehicle from the subject property to East Riverview road by
traveling a private logging road that comects to Mellick Road on at least 20 occasions since
2,

about f 996 or 1997. This road is well depicted on a Metsker map dated March 1959 and having
personally driven this road many times, I believe the Metsker map represents Mellick road quite
3

reasonablyi5. This is the same road that Harold Funk marked as a logging road on Exkubit 2 of
4

his depositioni6.Attached and included as E A b i t 1 is Google Earth imagery denoting the

:

location of Mellick road together with photography that I personally shot. The yellow place
6

markers in the Coogle Earth Imagery depict the roadway. The numbering of the place makers
7
corresponds to the individual photographs that were taken at those locations. The layout of this

road closely resembles the layout of the road as it appears in Exhibit 2 of the Funk Deposition.

17. The earliest date I can recall of using Mellick Road was in either 1996 or 1997. The
road was a bit narrow and overgrown, and, whle it was a little steeper and slower than the Apple
Blossom Road, it was very drivable. There were no obstacles that would prevent anyone from
driving either up or down this road.
18. Mr. Rook testified during his deposition, that he never tried driving down Mellick road
m d that the first, md appaently the only time he obsemed Melkiick Road was i

snow stom of 1995 or 1996 while flying to his tower because the snow was so heavy, he
couldn't get to the tower via a roadn. Fvlr. Rook's testimony would lead one to believe that

Mellick road was little more than a goat trait, unusable for vehicular access. His opinion appears
to be based on little: more t h m hearsayH md his one observation of the road immediately after a
heavy snow stonn from a helicopterZ0.Since I personally drove the road sometime in 1996 or
1997, I believe Mr. Rook's testimony about the road to be incorrect.
19. Mr. Funk testified during his deposition that Mellick Road did extend into his propem
in Section 152" He also testified that a logging road extended from Mellick Road into the
Southeast quarter of Section 2 122.
20. Attached and included herein as E h b i t 2, is a copy of Exhibit 2 from the Deposition of
Harold Funk illustrating, in blue ink, the portion of the Apple BIossorn Road that Harold Funk
used to access his property. On this map, I identified the location of the subject property in green
to illustrate that Harold Funk's use of the road did not extend into or over the Defendant's land.
2 1. The legal access to Signal Point road that benefits our land is the same easement that
the Johnsons and McHughs obtained from Idaho Forest Industries and is recorded in Book 292,
Page 353 of the Kootenai County Recorders Office as hstrument # 773361, filed July 6, 197823.
22. This affidavit incorporates by reference the following Exhibits from the Affidavit of
Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment, filed July 24,2007. The
originals of which are attached to the affidavit.
Exhibit A, the Viewers Report for Mellick Road filed as Instrument #756281 in Book 288,
Page 568.

N RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
Exhibit B, a copy of Case no: 65077, ORDER I
SANCTIONS.
Exhibit 6, CASE NO. 65077, S

tSRU JUDGEMENT FOR DEFENDANTS.

Exhibit D, the Affidavit of Bruce h d e r s o n in SuppoPt of Defendants Opposition to

S u m q Judgment.
Exhibit H. copies of Kooteaai Counq Shed-iff"snlcident reports.
Exhibit Q, Access License Agreement between Great Nodhem Broadcasting and Douglas
sand Brenda Lawrence.
Exhibit R, Billing Statement from Blue Sky Broadcasting.

23. This affidavit incorporates by reference the follotving Exlxbits from the Deposition of
Harold E

d ,August 17,2007 . The originals of which are attached to the transcript filed 10

September 2007.
Exhibit 1, a copy of a portion of a Metsker Map.
Exhibit 2, B l o w p map of portion of Exlxbit 1; re: Blossom Mountain.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10th day of September, 2007

Residing at
C o m i s s i o n expires

Exhibit 1 - Google Earth Satellite Imagery
Source - Google Earth
Numbered yellow place marks correspond to the individual
photographs (attached)and taken by defendant in July 2007.

Image 1
Provides complete overview of road system and identifies the Capstar
and Nextel sites in relationship to the roads.Yellow place marks identify
Mellick road as it leaves Schilling Loop road (upper right) and travels
south to intersect with Apple Blossom Road (near pin 1 3). Yellow place
marks then follow Apple Blossom Road west to Signal Point and then
Road (Upper left).
north to East Rive~ew

Image 2
View is looking towards the south and depicts Melllck road as it leaves
Schilling Loop road. Also denotes the approximute locaiion of where
photos 1A, 1 B, 2, and 3 were token.

Image 3
Position of viewer moves south. View is still looking towards the south
and still depicts Mellick road and where photo(s)4, 5, and 6 were
taken.

Image 4
Position of viewer again moves towards the so&. View now depicts
the private road as it leaves the public portion of Meltick road and
travels to the Southwest quarter of Section 22. Wmin Mew is the
Capstar parcel (upper center) and the Nextel tower (upper left).

Image 5
Position of the viewer moves south, right over top of the mountain and
is looking towards the west and is overlooking the Defendants' land. At
pin 1 3 (bottom center) is where the p&de logging road intersects
Apple Blossom Road, just to the east of the Defendants' land. Pin 14
identifies where the Defendants' gate is located.

Position of viewer moves to the west and is IooWng towards the northwest. Road to the right of pin #15 travels to the tower bated in the
Southwest quarter of Section 2 1 . Near pin # 17 is where Apple Blossom
Road intersects with Signal Point road.

Position of viewer has moved north-westerw and is looking towards the
north. Just north of pin #18 is the turn around area located at the end
of the county maintained portion of Signal Point road. A yellow iron
gate is placed there and restricts travel to the solrth.

Position of viewer has moved to the north and depicts Signal Point road
as it travels towards East Rive~kw.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-02-7671
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND
BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
PLAl NTIF F

VS.
HEARING DATE: Sept. 24, 2007
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife,

TIME:

3:00 p.m.

JUDGE: JOHN T. MITCHELL

Defendants.

Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, by and through
their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, submit the following opposition to
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment:

OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Capstar's unverifiedcomplaint alleges that it owns real property in
Kootenai County. Plaintiff seeks to establish that it has a right t o cross the land
of Defendants under theories of easement by necessity, by implication or by
prescriptive use.' Plaintiff has previously alleged that it had an express
easement, but that theory was rejected on appeal. Plaintiff acquired title to i t s
land in 2000. In November of 2002, Plaintiffs filed the instant action.
The opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence is based on this
memorandum, the court records and the affidavits that have been filed in this
action in support of their oppositions to Plaintiffs motions for summary
judgment.

DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS OF "UNDISPUTED FACTS"
Many of the facts alleged by Plaintiff a being "undisputed" are not
supported by the record in this action. Defendants submit that the following
facts are undisputed:
1.

Since 1966, General Telephone has had a deeded right to use an

access road that crosses the Lawrence parcel in section 21 (Ex. "W", Weeks
Affidavit);

Second, third and fourth Causes o f Action o f Plaintiff's Complaint.
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General Telephone also acquired a legal right to cross section 28

2.

(see Exhibit "X"-Affidavit

of Weeks); whereas Funk has never had the right to

cross section 28;

3.

Section 28 was never owned by Funk, therefore there is no unity of

title in this case;
4.

TheownerofSection28isnotapartytothisaction;

5.

Funk has always had access to his lands from Mellick Road (See Aff.

of Lawrence);

6.

Funk is not a party to this action;

7.

Plaintiff seeks to quiet title to the Lawrences land and obtain a

judgment that it has the right to cross section 28 and the Lawrence parcel via
the road used by CTE;
In 1 975, Funk moved to Aberdeen and then to American Falls,

8.

Idaho, where he has resided since. (Funk Deposition, hereinafter "FD" 28:20 to
29:24);
After moving to American Falls, Funk visited his land on Blossom

9.

Mountain only two or three times (FD 30:25 to 31 :4);
10.

Funk has not visited the Blossom Mountain land since 1981 (FD

31 :1 7).
11.

In 1 988, Rook contacted Funk about buying land from Funk on the

top of Blossom Mountain (FD 37:3 to 39:5; Rook Deposition, hereinafter "RD",
10:19 to 13:12);
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FunkagreedtosellthelandtoRook. Accesstothelandwasnever

12.

discussed. Funk never took Rook to the land. Rook first traveled to the land
only after the purchase from Funk had closed (RD 13.1 7 to 16:20; FD, Id);

13.

After buying the land, Rook received permission from CTE to use its

road to access the land purchased (RD 58:4 to 58:15);

14.

Rook continued using the CTE access road with CTE's permission

until he sold the subject land (RD, ID. See also 53:5 to 5411 1 ) .
Mr. Rook does not remember signing an affidavit in this case (RD

15.

48:3 to 48:9);

59:l 1 to 59:4 and 55:14 to 56:17);
17.

Rook could not draw a map of the Blossom Mountain land or the

access to the land (RD 60: 1 );

18.

Funk acknowledged that the access road was gated (FD 18:14 to

1 9.

Rook obtained a key from Mead, who administered the CTE road

19:4)

access (FD 27:9 to 27:l 1 ).
Funk obtained a key from CTE to use the access road (FD 26:3 to

20.
28: 12);
21.

Mead gave Funk permission as well (FD 44:17 to 44:2 1 ) ;

22.

Funk identified the portion of the access road used (FD 51 : I 1 to

51 :25).
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23.

Funk never talked to Ullrich about the use of Section 28; Funk did

not own land in Section 28; and Funk did not cross section 28 for his access (FD
54:l 1 to 54:21; 55:4 to 55:s; 59:9 to 56:23).
24.

Funk did not use the portion of the access road crossing the

Lawrence parcel (FD 66: 1 5 to 66:2 1).

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment should not be granted if reasonable people could
reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inference from the evidence, as
summary judgment is proper where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of
material fact. Farm Credit ofSpokane v. Stevenson, 1 25 ldaho 270, 869 P.2d
1365; Rule 56(c), ldaho R. Civ. P.
Summary judgment is only proper if the pleadings, depositions, and
admission on the file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 1.R.C.P 56(c).
If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, the trial court
should grant the motion for summary judgment. Farm Credit Bank v. Stevenson,
125 ldaho 270, 272, 896 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1 994). If the nonmoving party does
not come forward with evidence as provided in I.R.C.P. 56(c), then summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party." Meikle v. Torry
Watson, 138 ldaho 680 (2003). Summary judgment is properly granted in favor
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
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of the moving party when the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of

an element essential t o that party's case upon which that party bears the burden
of proof at trial. Meiklcr v. Torry Watson, 138 ldaho 680 (2003).

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
ldaho Code 5 - 2 0 3 ~recites the following:
No action for the recovery of real property, or for the
recovery of the possession thereof, can be maintained,
unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor,
predecessor or grantor, was seized or possessed of the
property in question within five (5) years before the
commencement of the action; and this section includes
possessory rights to lands and mining claims.
ldaho Code 5 - 2 0 4 ~recites the following:
No cause of action, or defense to an action, arising out
o f the title to real property, or to rents or profits out of
the same, can be effectual unless it appears that the
person prosecuting the action, or making the defense,
or under whose title was seized or possessed of the
premises in question within twenty (20) years before
the commencement of the act in respect to which such
action is prosecuted or defense made.
Plaintiff's complaint makes no reference to its predecessors interest. Yet
Plaintiff seemingly alleges that its predecessors in interest acquired rights to use

This statute was amended in 2006, after the instant action was filed.
See prior footnote.
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the Lawrence parcel and that those rights somehow inure to the benefit of
Plaintiff. Any such rights would necessarily had to have been litigated to be
perfected. Plaintiff has offered no evidence on the subject.
Plaintiff's present claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitation.
If Plaintiff's predecessors had any rights to use the Lawrence parcel, those
claims are now stale and barred by the statute of limitations.

LACHES
Whether or not a party is guilty of laches is ordinarily a question of fact.
Osterloh v, State ofldaho, 100 Idaho 702, 604 P.2d 71 6. It is beyond question
that the Lawrences have been prejudiced by the alleged stale claims which
Plaintiff now seeks to enforce. If Plaintiff and i t s predecessors truly enjoyed
easements by implication, necessity and/or by prescriptive use, those claims
should have been perfected through litigation. The failure to pursue the claims
by Plaintiff's predecessors has clearly prejudiced the ability of the Lawrences and
their predecessors to defend against the claims.

ELEMENTS OF EASEMENT BY l MPLlCATlON NOT SATlSFlED

OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
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Funk severed the Lawrence parcel from his remaining land in 1975 when
*

he entered into the Sale Agreement with Human synergistic^.^ In 1 972, Funk
acquired the right t o cross the Mead property in Section 21 but Funk had no
right to cross Section 28 t o access his lands in Sections 21 and 22.
The parcel at issue in this litigation was not created (or severed) from
Funk's other lands until 1989 when Funk conveyed to Kootenai road casting.'
Clearly, then, until the 1989 conveyance to Kootenai Broadcasting, the
land allegedly purchased by Capstar was but an undivided portion of the acreage
held by Funk in Section 22. Funk had access to that section via Nellick Road.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record that suggests that there was
an existing access road t o the land that would eventually become the Kootenai
Broadcasting parcel in T975when Funk severed what would become the
Lawrence parcel (the servient estate) from Funk's other holdings (the dominant
estate).
Therefore, the easement claimed by Capstar did not exist in 1975 when
the servient estate was severed from the dominant estate.
Furthermore, Funk never had the legal right to cross Section 28 from
Section 21 to access his land in Section 22. Funk cannot create by implication

See affidavit of Weeks filed September 13, 2004, pg. 2, paragraph "e" and Exhibit "EM
thereto.

Affidavit of Weeks filed September 13, 2004, paragraph 3e, and Exhibit "Q" thereto.
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that which did not exist in fact in 1975. There was no access road to the land
at issue in this action in 1975. Thus, the key element to establish an easement
by implication is lacking in the instant action.
The Idaho Supreme Court stated in the case of Bear Island Water Assoc.,
Id., that:
To establish an easement by implication from prior use,
the party seeking to establish the easement must
demonstrate three essential elements: (1) unity of title
or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the
dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long
enough before conveyance of the dominant estate t o
show that the use was intended to be permanent; and
(3) the easement must be reasonably necessary t o the
proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Close v.
Rensink, 95 ldaho 72, 76, 501 P.2d 1383, 1387; Davis
v. Gowen, 83 ldaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d 403, 406-07
(1 961). (Emphasis added).
The third element recited above requires proof that a disputed access is
reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. As stated
in the affidavits of Douglas Lawrence and Bruce Anderson, Funk has always had
access to his Section 22 property via Nellick Road. Funk or his successors can,
and should, provide access to Capstar.

EASENENT BY NECESSITY
An easement by necessity is founded on the following legal theory:
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
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"A way of necessity i s an easement arising from an
implied grant or implied reservation; it is of common
law origin and i s supported by the rule of sound public
policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for
occupancy or successful cultivation ... It is a universallv
established principle that where a tract of land is
conveved which is separated from the hiahwav bv other
lands of the qrantor or surrounded bv his lands or by
his and those of third persons, there arises, by
implication, in favor of the grantee, a way of necessity
across the premises of the qrantor to the highway."
(Emphasis added).
Burley Brick andsand Co. v. Cofer, 102 ldaho 333, 335, 629 P.2d 1 16, 1 1 68
(1 98l)(quoting 1 7A Am. Jur. Easements 5 58 (1 957)); see 25 Am. Jur. 2d

Easements and Licenses 55 30-031 (2005). One who claims an easement by
necessity across another's land must prove "(1 ) unity of title and subsequent
separation of the dominant and servient estates; (2) necessity of the easement at
the time of severance; and (3) great present necessity for the easement." Bear
Island WaterAss'n, fnc. v. Brown, 125 ldaho 71 7, 725, 874 P.2d 528, 536

In the matter at hand, Capstar can neither demonstrates nor alleges that
there was a necessity for the access across the Lawrence parcel for the benefit of
the parcelpurchased by Capstarwhen the Lawrence parcel was severed from the
other land retained by Funk. Funk obviously had access to his other lands when
he severed the parcel sold to Human Synergistics in 1975, otherwise Funk would
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have taken great care t o reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to
Human Synergistics in 1975.
It should be noted that the parcels of land at issue sit on top of a

mountain. The lands are not suited for farming or residential development. The
land is suitable only for the maintenance of radio and phone towers. Nothing in
the record establishes that anything but infrequent access to these sites is
commonplace.

EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION
To establish an easement by prescription, a party must establish by clear
and convincing evidence all of the elements necessary for a prescriptive
easement. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 ldaho 225, 229; Abbot v. Nampa SchoolDist.
No. 131, 1 1 9 ldaho 544. Because it is no trivial thing to take another's land
without compensation, easements by prescription are not favored by the law.
Simmons v. Perkins, 63 ldaho 136. A prescriptive easement cannot be granted if
the use of the servient tenement was by permission of its owner, because such
use, by definition, i s not adverse to the rights of the owner. Simmons, Id.
In the recent case Hughes v. Fisher, 124 ldaho 474, 129, P.3d 1223
(2006), the ldaho Supreme Court created an exception to the general rule that
the regular crossing of another's property is presumed to be adverse. Where a
landowner constructs a way over the land for his own use and convenience, the
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mere use thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be
presumed to be by way of permission.
The conclusionary statements offered by Capstar in support of its motion
for summary judgment do not constitute clear and convincing evidence of
adverse use that would benefit Capstar in the instant case. Capstar, itself,
makes no claim of any sort that it has used the Lawrence parcel openly,
notoriously, continuously and in a hostile manner for the statutory period.
No prescriptive claim has been established and Capstars use of the
Lawrence access road has alwavs been p e r m i ~ s i v e . ~

DATED this

!I

O d a y of September, 2007.

Respectfully submitted,
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

A

u

J hn . Whelan
~ t t o r n for
e ~ Defendants

See affidavits o f Daniel Rebor and Douglas Lawrence.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ ' ' d aof~ September, 2007, 1 caused to
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur dl Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:

U.S. Nail, postage prepaid
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684
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SUSAN P. W E K S
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1875 N. Lakewood Dr, Ste. 200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 8 14
Telephone: (208) 667-0685
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1683
ISB ff4255
Aeorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTFUCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Case No. CV 02-7671

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

I
INTRODUCTION

In their statement of facts, Defendants claim it is relevant to this suit that Capstar
travels across land owned by others in Section 28 to reach its destination. Defendants
claim this fact is relevant to the present suit. This fact is irrelevant to the issue before the
court regarding whether Plaintiff has an easement across Defendants' property.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMOQLLNDl?lvll;N SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
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Defendants claim that the statute of limitations claim PlaintifP s complaint
for two reasons. First, Defendants claim Plaintiff made no reference to predecessors in
interest in its complaint. However, Paragraph XVII of PlaintifPs complaint alleged:
'Capstar and its predecessors in title have used the Blossom Mountain Road as it crosses
the Defendants' real property for access to Capstar's real property openly, notoriously,
continuously, adversely and under claim of right for a period exceeding five (5) years."
Defendants also claim that PIaintifPs predecessor's use of the road does
not inure to Plaintiffs benefit. This claim is contrary to Idaho law. Idaho recognizes
tacking to achieve the prescriptive period of use on an easement appurtenant. In Hodgins
v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 76 P.3d 969 (2003) the Supreme Court clearly noted:

The prescriptive period in Idaho is five years. I.C. tj 5-203.
Therefore, each Property Owner must prove that he or his predecessors used
the roadway across the Sales' property for some uninterrupted five-year
period of time before the suit was filed. See State ex rel. Harnatz v. Fox, 100
Idaho 140, 146, 594 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1979) (holding I.C. tj 5-208 "in effect
gives an owner five years to take the necessary and appropriate legal action
to have an unauthorized use of property stopped"). Tacking is the concept
that allows the current owner to combine his or her prescriptive use with
that of a previous owner, in order to meet the five-year statutory
requirement. Thus, a claimant who has not owned the subject property for
the statutory period "may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's
predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combiile such
predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the requisite five
continuous years of adverse use." Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho at 680, 946
P.2d at 980 (citations omitted).
Thus it is entirely appropriate for Plaintiff to incorporate its predecessors' use of
the road into its claim.
LACHES
Lawrences claim that the doctrine of laches prohibits this lawsuit. Defendants
claim "it is beyond question" that Lawrences have been prejudiced by the alleged stale
claims Plaintiff seeks to enforce. However, prior to Lawrences locking the gate and
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prohibiting travel on their propert.y, Plaintiff and its predecessors right to cross the
properly was not challenged. Thus, the adverse possession claim is not stale.

DISPUTED FACTS
Originally in this motion it was argued that the implied reservation and
prescriptive use claimed in this case was established across the Lawrence parcel from the
time Funk sold the Lawrence parcel to Human Syngergistics in July 1975.
At his deposition, Mr. Funk was provided the Metsker map to "refkesh his
memory'" regarding the roads in the area. The Metsker map is inaccurate because it
shows Blossom Mountain in Section 21, when in fact what is cornmonly k n o w as the
top of Blossom Mountain lies in Section 22 (where the tower sites are located.) Mr. Funk
was confused by this reference point (Funk- Dep Tr p. 10,ll. 10-25). Mr. Funk testified
that he was up to the property in the six year period between when he bought the property
until he sold the Lawrence parcel 20 to 30 times and that he used the GTE road each
time. (Funk Dep Tr pp. 11-25; p. 26'11. 1-4.) Mr. Funk noted during his deposition that
the Metsker map showed the road different than he recalled (Funk Dep Tr p. 45'11. 1118.) Mr. Funk testified that Bell telephone had its site at Blossom Mountain. (Funk Dep
Tr p. 48'11. 17-19.) Mr. Funk then agreed when defendants' counsel marked his access
as going from the road to the top of Blossom Mountain as shown on the Metsker map in a
different route than the GTE easeement. (Funk- Dep Tr p. 49'11. 2-15). Nonetheless, Mr.
Funk continued to indicate that the road marked on the Metsker map and the road he
followed was the GTE access road. (Funk Dep Tr p. 53,lI. 7-24.) W e n shown a map
with Blossom Mountain and the tower sites properly located in Section 22, Mr. Funk
testified that the road depicted on that exhibit was the route he followed, which ended at
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the telephone tower. (Funk Dep Tr p. 64,lI. 7-25, p. 65,11. 1-25; p. 66,ll. 1-4.) Mr. Funk
indicated the road was built by the telephone company. (Funk Dep Tr p. 68, 11. 12-18.)
Mr. Funk placed the access road and the gate on the access road in different locations
depending on which map he was looking at based on where it showed Blossorn
Mountain. (See Exhibits 2 and 6, Funk deposition.)
Thus, Funk's own deposition testimony is unclear. However,

"Wben an action will be tried before the court without a
jury, the trial court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most
probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it
and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences. S h a w e r v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 36061,93 P.3d 685,691-92 (2004). "The test for reviewing the inferences
drawn by the trial court is whether the record reasonably supports the
inferences." Id.

J. R. Silnplot Co. v. Bosen, -Idaho
2006).

,

P.3d -(S.Ct. Opinion 3 1706,

The GTE access road was surveyed by GTE, a copy of which survey was
provided by Mr. Lawrence in a previous deposition in another matter (Exhibit "Y" to
Weeks Affidavit filed March 9,2004). This surveyed road is consistent with Exhibit 6 of
Mr. Funk's deposition. Even though Mr. Funk's two maps at deposition are not
consistent, his testimony that he was using the GTE road is consistent throughout the
deposition. Thus, the reasonable inference to be drawn from his repeated testimony that
he used the GTE road is that as depicted in Exibit "Y", which is consistent with Exhibit 6
of Mr. Funk's deposition.
EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION
The standards for establishment of a prescriptive easement were reiterated in

Akers, supra at 206 as follows:
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A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription
"must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the subject property,
wllich is characterized as: (I I open and notorious; (2) continuous and
unintempted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4) with the actual or
imputed knowledge of the owner of the sen~ienttenement (5) for the
statutory period." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 229,76 P.3d at 973. The statutory
period in question is five years. I.C. 5 5-203; Weaver, 134 Idaho at 698, 8
P.3d at 1241. A claimant may rely on his own use, or he "may rely on the
adverse use by the claimant's predecessor for the prescriptive period, or
the claimant may combine such predecessor's use with the claimant's own
use to establish the requisite five continuous years of adverse use."
h d g i n s , 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. Once the clairnant presents
proof of open, notorious. continuous. uninterrupted use of the claimed
right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use
began, he raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a
claim of right. Wood v. I-laglund, 13 1 Idaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 383,
385-86 (1998): hrlarshaZ2 v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 680,946 P.2d 975, 980
(1997). The burden then shifis to the owner of the servient tenement to
show that the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a license,
contract, or agreement. Wood, 131 Idaho at 703,963 P.2d at 386;
Mar*shal'l, 130 Idaho at 680,946 P.2d at 980. The nature of the use is
adverse if "it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the property."
Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 23 l , 7 6 P.3d at 975. The state of mind of the users
of the alleged easement is not controlling; the focus is on the nature of
their use. Id. at 23 1-32, 76 P.3d at 975-76.

From the point Mr. Funk sold the Lawrence parcel, he did not use the road very
often because he moved from the area. In 1989, Mr. Funk sold another portion of his
property. Kootenai Broadcasting purchased this property which was located on the very
top of Blossom Mountain (Rook Dep Tr p. 8,ll. 19-25.)
Mr. Rook testified there was only one road to the top of Blossom Mountain (Rook
Dep Tr p. 15,ll. 18-23.) The road he used was being used by GTE (Dep Tr p. 17,lI. 1421). Mr. Rook testified consistent with his affidavit that the road he used for access was
the one used was an existing access road from Signal Point road and that it terminated in
the area of the General Telephone site. (Rook Dep Tr p. 52,ll. 12-25; p. 53,ll. 1-8.) .)
Mr. Rook testified that his parcel had access by one road and Exhibit "C" of his affidavit
was illustrative of the road as he recalled it. (Rook Dep Tr p. 70,ll. 13-25.)
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Mr. Rook" sconipanies owled the site and used the road for ten years (Rook Dep
Tr p. 15-16) Mr. Rook indicated that his contract engineer would be at the parcel of
propefiy every two to three weeks to do maintenance, and sometimes every week. (Rook
Dep Tr p. 32,ll. 4-10; p. 38,ll. 23-25; p. 39,11. 1-2.) Mr. Rook also visited the site four
times a year. (Rook Dep Tr p. 40,ll. 19-21). A tower was built on the site in 1991 or
1992. (Rook Dep Tr p. 35,11, 7-19.) Rook allowed Trinity Broadcasting to locate a dish
next to his tower. (Rook Dep Tr p. 65.11.4-8.) Mr. Rook also leased space. (Rook Dep
Tr p. 63,ll. 19-24
Lawences cite to Hughes v. Fisher, 124 Idaho 474, 129 P.3d 1223 (2006) for the
proposition that there is no prescriptive use in the present case. In Hughes v. Fisher, the
trial court reiterated the general rule that the regular crossing of another's property is
presumed to be adverse with the exception that where a landowner constructs a way over
the land for his own use and convenience, the mere use of it by others that doesn't
interfere with his use will be presumed permissive. In this case, there is no evidence that
Lawrence or his predecessor constructed the road. In the present case, there is evidence
that the road existed in 1966 when GTE obtained its easement across the road. It
certainly existed when Funk started using it, and it existed when Rook started using it.
There is no evidence it was constructed by Funk, Lawrence or any of their joint
predecessors in title. Thus, there is no basis to presume that the use by Funks and others
has been permissive.
The record supports a finding that Kootenai Broadcasting used this easement,
considered it had a right to use it, and did not abandon the easement. Therefore, Capstar
is entitled to this prescriptive easement as a successor in interest.
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EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION
In a convoluted argument, Lawrences argue that the record does not suppod a
finding that the road across Lawrences' parcel was intended to serve as access to the
Capstar parcel at the time of the severance because the Capstar parcel had not yet been
created. Lawrences are confused. At the time that Funks transferred the Section 21
parcel in 1975, they retained their parcel in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22. Thus, if
an implied easement arose, it arose at the time of severance of the servient estate in favor
of Funks' retained parcel in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 as the domillant estate.
The implied easement is analyzed at the time of the severance of Lawrences' parcel from
Funks' original holdings, not at the later date when Funks sold a portion of the dominant
estate to Kootenai Broadcasting as argued by Lawrences. If an implied easement was
created in 1975 for the benefit of Funks' retained Section 22 parcel, it passes by operation
of law when Funks transfer any portion of the retained Section 22 parcel. See I.C. 5 55603 (easements pass with property).
Lawrences also claim that in 1975 that Funks had access to their retained Section
22 property through their property from Mellick Road. In support of this contention,
Lawrences provide the affidavit of Bruce Anderson, Kootenai County Surveyor, and the
Viewer's Report for Mellick Road and a Metsker map from 1959 which they contend
supports their position.' Lawrences cite to the three elements of an easement implied
from prior use and contend that Capstar has failed in its requirement on the third element
that the easement must be reasonably necessary to the property enjoyment of the
1

Lawrences contend that Metsker maps are generally reliable and therefore they should not have to lay a
foundation for the accuracy of the map. Although Capstar disagrees with this contention, it will address
that matter in a separate motion to strike.
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dominant estate based upon these documents. These documents do not support
Lawrences' argument.
Funks acquired their properly frorn Radens and Marcoes. (Weeks Affidavit filed
3/9/2004, Exhibits ""B" and "C".) At the time of purchase, Funks acquired Government
Lot 3 of Section 15; the Southeast Quarter of Section 21; Government Lot 4, the
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (SW NW %) and the Southwest Quarter
(SW %) of Section 22. Bruce Anderson's testified in his affidavit2 that based upon his
review of the Viewer's Report and Judge Haman's opinion in Loudin v. Stokes that Funks
could access their Section 15 property frorn Mellick Road. M i l e this statement is true, it
leaves unaddressed the issue of whether Funk's could proceed on Mellick Road beyond
the Section 15 property to access their Section 22 property as Lawrences claim.
The following is an illustrative depiction of the properties in question utilizing a
Kootenai County road map. The properties Funks originally acquired are highlighted in
yellow. The red x's on the illustration are the approximate location of Mellick Road
(along the creek) as laid out by the Viewer's Report for Mellick Road.

2

This affidavit was not separately filed with the court. Rather, it is contained as Exhibit "D" to the
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence.
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As can be seen from the Viewer's Report, the public road ended in the Northeast
Quarter (NE !4 ) of Section 21. Funk never owned property in the Northeast Quarter of
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
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Section 2 1. Thus, Mellick Road as laid out by the county surveyor did not access Section

Referencing the Metsker map relied upon by Lawrence, it depicts the road
extending beyond the terminus of the public road as established in the Viewer's report,
through the remaining portion of the Northeast Quader of Section 2 1 and turning east
back into Section 22. Again, Funks never owned the Northeast Quarter of Section 21.
There is absolutely no evidence that Funks successors used Mellick Road as extended to
access the Section 22 property. Thus, the record is devoid of any evidence that Funk
would have had a right to continue beyond the public road to access the property he
acquired in Section 22.
Further, the inference that Lawrences wish this court to draw fiom the 1958
Metsker map is that the road shown in the general vicinity of Mellick Road existed in
1975 and provided access to the Section 22 property. Lawrences contend this court
should take judicial notice of the Metsker map because of Lawrences' view that Metsker
maps have been relied on for many decades and are readily verifiable. However, Metsker
maps have also been know11 to be wrong. As a general rule, maps, plats and diagrams
must be properly authenticated and shown to be accurate before they can be admitted as
evidence. 29A Am.Jur. Evidence 5 990. This map has not been properly authenticated,
or shown to be accurate for the relevant time period. If the evidence on the map is as
readily verifiable as Lawrences contend in their request for judicial notice, they should
have verified it with admissible evidence submitted in conjunction with the map.
Otherwise, the document is hearsay. It does not contradict Funk's testimony that in 1975
when he acquired the property, there was no access to Section 22 from Mellick Road.
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Although not completely articulated in Lawences' memorandum, it is anticipated
they will argue that because he owned property in Section 15 which touched on the
public right-of-way that that he could have developed a road across his Section 15
holding into Section 22, which is contiguous to Section 15 and lies directly south of
Section 15. In Akevs v. D.L. Wbzite Gonst., Inc. 142 Idaho 293, 302, 127 P.3d 196,205
(2005), our Supreme Court held that:
With respect to an implied easement from prior use, under Idaho law
"reasonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity
required for an easement implied by necessity." Davis, 133 Idaho at 643,
991 P.2d at 368. W e n determining whether such "reasonable necessity"
existed, a court does not look to the present moment, but instead
determines whether reasonable necessity existed at the time the dominant
and servient estates were severed. Id. at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. Once an
implied easement by prior use is found to have existed at the time of
severance, it "is not later extinguished if the easement is no longer
reasonably necessary." Id. at 643,991 P.2d at 368. "[Aln implied
easement by prior use is appurtenant to the land and therefore passes with
all subsequent conveyances of the dominant and servient estates." Id.
In Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637,991 P.2d 362 (1999) our Supreme Court
addressed the showing necessary to establish the third element of an implied easement.
The court therein was presented with the argument that since there was an undeveloped
public right of way that could be developed to provide access to the dominant estate that
an implied easement did not arise at the date of severance. The court rejected this
argument, noting that an undeveloped access is not a usable access. The same is true
here. Funks' uncontroverted testimony is that as of the date of his purchase of his
property, Mellick Road did not provide access to his Section 22 property. Merely
because there was a public right of way that could have been developed and extended
through a portion of Funks' property, Funk was not required to develop and extend it.
Lawrences' contention that as of 1996 when he acquired the property that Mellick
Road had been developed to a point to allow use of it to access the property in question
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
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does not assist the court in its inquiry of the access in 1975, which is the relevant time
period.3
An implied easement does not end, even when reasonable necessity no longer
exists, Davis at 367. In the present case, the uncontroverled testimony of Harold Funk is
that the road in dispute was the only usable access to his repained Section 22 property in

1975. This statement is supported by the affidavit of Kelvin Brownsberger, Post Falls
Highway District road supervisor, indicating that Mellick Road is only partially
developed and maintained by the highway district (which portion based upon his exhibit
appears to be generally located in the Northwest Quarter of Section 15.)
Capstar has presented uncontroverted evidence that at the time of severance the
access was reasonably necessary. As Funks' successor in title, Capstar is entitled to the
benefit of the implied easement.
Lawrences also invites this court to examine the quality of Capstar's right to pass
over a portion of the access road lying in Section 28 in determining reasonable necessity.
Lawsences argue Funks can't establish a claim over Section 28 by implication. The
portion of the access road lying in Section 28 is unrelated to this suit as it was not owned
by Funks and Capstar is not anempting to establish an easement by necessity against a
stranger to title.
EASEMENT BY NECESSITY
Lawrences claim that there is no present necessity for use of the road because
Mellick Road as improved by John Mack, one of Funks' predecessors, now allows access
to the site. Lawrences contend there is no ilecessity because Capstar, as Funks' successor
in interest, has a right to use Mellick Road as now developed. Apparently, the argument
3

Further, there is admissible evidence in the record that this contention is not true.
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is that Capstar would have an implied easement across the road, eve11 though Funks never
used the road at the time of segregation.

On March 24,2004, John Mack prepared an affidavit in this matter on behalf of
Lau~ences.Mr. Mack indicated that in 1992 he purchased property in Section 22 from
Funks, and was the last remaining property owned by Funks. Mr. Mack indicated that at
the time he purchased, he inquired about access and the realtor told him he h e w the way.
Mr. Mack then relayed that in the spring of 1994, he was stopped by Idaho Forest
Indsutries nad informed he did not have legal access across Section 28, and it was
demanded he stop traversing that section. Mr. Mack testified his Section 22 property was
landlocked. Mr. Mack indicated that as late as 1996, he was aneinpting to obtain
easements to access the Funk property. Mr. Mack testified that in 2002, he purchased
property from Fred Zuber in the East half of the Northwest % of Section 22 (property
never owned by Funks) to obtain access to the Funk parcel. Thus, Mr. Mack's affidavit
makes d e a r that Mellick Road did not provide access to the Funks parcels in 1996 as
claimed by Mr. Lawrence.
Consistent with Mr, Mack-s affidavit, it is apparent that Mellick Road as
developed today does not pass over Funks' property.

As demonstrated on the assessor's

map included as Exhibit "A" to Weeks' Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike
Lawrence Affidavit filed 7/24/07, Mellick Road as constructed today lies in the Northeast
Quarter and the Southeast Quarter of Section 22. Funks never owned either of these
parcels, and therefore, Capstar has no implied easement to travel the road across these
parcels of property. Funk, Kootenai Broadcasting and Capstar have not used Mellick
Road to access their properties. Thus, there would be no prescriptive easement right
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Capstar could assert. Capstar is not an entity entitled to condemn an easement under
Idaho Code Title 7 for a public ptlrpose. Thus, Capstar has no right to use Mellick Road
as constructed today. Without use of the cunent access road, Gapstar's parcel would be
landlocked. Therefore, it is currently necessary for Capstas to retain the historic access
road used by its predecessors.
CONCLUSION
Lawrences have failed to show that there is not an implied easement, a
prescriptive easement or an easement by necessity in favor of Capstar. Thus, the court
should grant Capstar's motion for summary judgment.
DATED this 17t" day of September, 2007.
JAMES, VERNON & W E K S , P.A.
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SUSAN P. %XEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1875 N. Lakewood Dr, Ste. 200
Cocur d'Alene, ID 838 14
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
ISB #4255
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Case No. CV 02-767 1

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS
OF AFFIDAVIT OF DOUG
LAWRENCE FILED SEPTEMBER
10,2007

VS.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

i

COMES NOW Plaintiff and pursuant to Rule 56 (e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
hereby moves to strike portions of the affidavit of Douglas Lawrence for the reasons enumerated
herein.
Regarding affidavits submitted in support of summary judgment, Posey v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 111 P.3d 162 (Idaho Ct.App. 2005) discussed the requirement that evidence
submitted by affidavit must be admissible to be considered by the court. Therein the court noted:
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Posey argues that nearly the entire affidavit is inadmissible because it does not
show that the malters averred to are based on personal howledge, contains
conclusory assertions, contains illadmissible hearsay and provides no foundation
for inboduction of attached exhibits. Posey's position is well taken.
Affidavits supporting or opposing a summary judgment motion must be made on
personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and must show affirnlatively that the affiant is competent to testifL to the matters
stated. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). These requirements "are not satisfied
by an affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by
personal knowledge. " (Cites omitted.)
The Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Co. court iirrther noted:
Eight documents are attached to the affidavit. No foundation is provided
concerning who prepared the documents, several of which, on their face, indicate
that they were not prepared by Ford but by the Galdwell dealership. The affidavit
purports to identify the documents without demonstration of the requisite personal
knowledge for authentication of the documents pursuant to I.R.E. 901 and
includes arguments as to the documents' legal e f i c t , none of which is admissible.
(Cite omitted.) To the extent that the documents are offered to show the truth of
assertions contained within them, the documents are hearsay for which no hearsay
rule exception has been established by the Griffith affidavit. In State v. Hill,140
Idaho 625, 97 P.3d 1014 (Ct.App. 2004). we described the foundational
requirements for application of I.R.E. 803(6), the exception to the hearsay rule for
business records:
Rule 803(6), the business record exception to the hearsay
rule, allows admission of a record or report if it was made
and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity and if it was the regular practice of that business to
make the report or record. See Henderson v. Sinith, 128
Idaho 444,450, 915 P.2d 6, 12 (1996); In the Interest of
S. K , 127 Idaho 5 13, 520, 903 P.2d 102, 109 (Ct.App.
1995). These foundational requireinents must be shown
through "the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witness." I.R.E. 803(6). That is, the record must be
authenticated by someone "who has custody of the record
as a regular part of his or her work or who has supervision
of its creation." Henderson, 128 Idaho at 450, 915 P.2d at
12. A document is not admissible under I.R.E. 803(6)
unless the person testifying has a personal knowledge of
the record-keeping system used by the business which
created the document. Id.; Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho
293,297, 900 P.2d 20 1,205 (Ct.App. 1995).
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Hill, 140 Idaho at 628, 9'7 P.3d at 10 17. The mere receipt and
retention by a business entity of a document that was created
elsewhere does not transfom the document into a business record
of the receiving entity for purpases of I.R.E. 803(6). Id.; In
[he Interest qfS. U:, 137 Idaho 5 13, 520,903 P.2d 102, 1 09
(Ct.App. 1995). Griffith's affidavit does not comply with the
requirements of Rule 803(6) with respect to any of the records
attached to his affidavit.

The following portions of Mr. Lawrence's affidavit should be stricken:
1.

Paragraph 4 is a legal conclusion with argument referenced to other individuals'

affidavits and depositions.
2.

Paragraph 5 is argument, and not based on defendant's personal knowledge.

3.

Paragraph 6 is argument and not based on defendant's personal knowledge.

4.

Paragraph 7 is argument based upon the deposition of Harold Fuilk, not

defendant's personal knowledge.
5.

Paragraph 8 is argument from the deposition of Harold Funk, not defendant's

personal knoweldge.

6.

Paragraph 9 is argument from the deposition of Harold Funk, not defendant's

personal knowledge.
7.

Paragraph 10 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

8.

Paragraph 1 1 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

9.

Paragraph 12 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

10.

Paragraph 13 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.
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1 1.

Paragraph 14 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

12.

Paragraph 15 is argument.

13.

Paragraph 16, sentences 2 , 3 , 5 and 7 are argument, and not based upon personal

knowledge. Further, there is no foundation for the summary contained on Exhibit 1 regarding
intersections.
14.

Paragraph 18 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

15.

Paragraph 19 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

16.

Paragraph 20 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

17.

Paragraph 2 1 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

DATED this 17"' day of September, 2007
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

BY:
SUSAN P. WEEKS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1875 N. Lakewood Dr, Ste. 200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14
Telephone: (208) 667-0685
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1683
ISB if4255
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
GAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Case No. CV 02-7671
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS
OF AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS
LAWRENCE FILED JULY 24,
2007

Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
L A W N C E , husband and wife,
Defendants.

I

Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence came
before the Court for hearing on August 7,2007. The court heard argument of counsel,
reviewed the affidavits, and made its findings of record at the hearing, Plaintiff's

Motion

to Strike is granted in part and denied in part.
1.

The last sentence of paragraph 3 of Mr. Lawrence's affidavit is stricken.

The objection is overruled with respect to the remainder of paragraph 3.
2.

Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 are stricken.
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3.

Paragraph 8 is sustained on foundation grounds, but overruled as to the

identification of Exhibit E, Metsker's slap.
4.

The motion to strike the first sentence of Paragraph 9 is overruled and

granted on the second sentence and the third sentence. The Exhibit remains as evidence.

5.

The motion to strike Paragraph 10 is denied.

6.

The motion is granted with respect to the second sentence of Paragraph

7.

The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 14.

8.

The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 15.

9.

The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 17.

10.

The motion is granted with respect to the third, fourth and fifth sentences

only of Paragraph1 8.
11.

The motion is granted with respect to the second and third sentences of

Paragraph 19.
12.

The motion is granted as to the second sentence of Paragraphs 20.

13.

The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 22.

14.

Paragraph 23 is stricken.

15 .

Paragraph 24 is stricken.

16.

The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 40.

17.

The motion is granted as to the second, fourth and fifth sentences of

Paragraph 44.
18.

Paragraph 47 is stricken.

19.

The motion is granted as to the last sentence of Paragraph 48.
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20.

Paragraph 49 is stricken,

2 1.

Paragraph 5 1 is stricken.

22.

Paragraph 52 is stricken.

23.

Paragraph 54 is stricken.

24.

The rnotion is granted to all sentences except the first sentence of

Paragraph 57,
25.

The rnotion is granted to all sentences except the first sentence of

Paragraph 58.
26.

The fifth, seventh, eight and tenth sentence are stricken of Paragraph 59.

27.

The objection is ovemled as to Paragraph 60.

28.

Paragraph 6 1 is stricken.

29.

Paragraph 67 is stricken.

30.

Paragraph 68 is striken.

33.

Paragraph 69 is stricken.

DATED this E % a y

of September, 2007.

"\/

D' trict J dge
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Hand Delivered
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SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON r4;: WEEKS, P.A.
1875 N. Lakewood Dr, Ste. 200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14
Telephone: (208) 667-0685
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1683
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST SUDIGIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Case No. CV 02-767 1

Plaintiff,

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STRIKE
DEFENDANTS' PLEADINGS OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME

VS.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
L A m N C E , husband and wife,
Defendants.

1

Plaintiffs moved to strike: (1) Defendants' Motion to Strike portions of certain
affidavit filed by Plaintiff in support of its summary judgment, (2) Defendants'
opposition response to Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and supporting
affidavits, (3) Defendants' Motion for Enlargement of Time, and (4) Request for Judicial
Notice because they were not timely. In the alternative, Plaintiffs moved for an
enlargement of time to respond to the above pleadings. The Court having heard
argument of counsel on August 7,2007, and enunciated its findings of record,
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NOW T H E E F O m , the Court grants the motion for enlargement of time to
respond and denies the motion to strike as being moot.

DATED this

4"[T
day of September, 2007.

u

(TOEIN p. MITCHELL
istric Judge
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ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' PLEADINGS OR
IN THE KTERNATIVE FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME: 2
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SUSAN I?. WEEKS
J M S , VEWON & W E K S , P.A.
1875 N. Mewood Br, Ste. 200
Coem d'AIene, 1D 838 7 4
Telephone: (208) 667-0655
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684
TSB a 2 5 5

2081 SEP 2 1 PH 2: 4 4

Attorneys far P l a h ~ f l

TN THE DISmTCT COURT OF 'IFE FlRST JtrDICTAL DISTRTCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR T E CQmROF KOOTENAI

CMSTAR R4DIO OPERATWG COWANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Case No. CV 02-7671
MORON TO SHORTEN TIME

VS.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWENCE, busband sul& wife,
Defendants.
CONES NOW the above named Plaintiff, and moves the Court for an order shortening
the notice of time to hear Plaintiff's Motion to Correct Judgment. This motion is made on the
fact that Plaintiff made a calendaring crror and did not file the motion on September 1 7,2007

DATED this 2lS day of September, 2007.
J A m S , VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

BY

W M - U &,

SUSAN P. WEEKS

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME: 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERmCE
I hereby certiiy that on the 2 1 day of September, 2007, I caused to be sen-eda true and
comct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below. and addressed to the

following:
U.S. Mail

Overnight Mail

Wand Delivered

Telecopy (FAX)

Jolin P. %%elan
213 4@'Street
Coeur d' Alene, iJC) 83 8 16

Facsimile: (205) 664-2240

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME: 2

SUSGV P.W E K S
JAMES, V E W O N & m E K S , P.A.
1875 N. Lakewood Dr, Ste. 200
Coeur d'Atene, LD 838 1 4
Telephone: (205) 667-0683
ISB M 2 5 5
Attorneys for Plaintip

N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlRST JTjDICTAL DISTRICT OF TFE

S T A T E OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAT
CAPST,.liR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY. '
a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 02-767 1
MOTION TO CORRECT
JUDGMENT

vs.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,

Defendants.
COMES S O W Plaintiff and pursuant to Rule 60(a), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
moves the Court to enter the judgment eotered September 11. 2007 regarding judicial notice of

the Metsker nap. The Court did not rule that the Metsker map was accurate. Tt ruled that it
would take notice that it was a Metsker map.

DATED this 20.
day of September. 2007.

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

BY:

3

M.&

SUSAN P.WEEKS
Attorneys for PIaintiff

MOTION TO C0RIZ;ECT JUDGMENT: 1

I b a b y certify %aton the

y of September, 1caused to be senred a true and

correct copy of the foregoing doctrment by the method indicated below, and addressed to tile

following:

U.S. Mail

Ovenniat Mail

Hand DeJivered

Telecopy (FAX)

John P. Whe1a:n
2 13 4thStreet
Coe~ud'Alene, ID 8381 6
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240

MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT: 2

0 9 / 2 5 1 2 0 0 7 1 4 2 7 FAX

6642240

Whelan,

John P

P C

jOt-fN P, WHEMN, P.C.
21 3 N. 4thStreet
Goeur d3Alene,ID 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax; (208) 664-2240
lSB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF KOOTENAI

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. CV-02-7671
ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO AMEND ANSWER

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants,

I

Defendants', Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, Motion for
Leave to Amend Answer came regularly before the Coun on September 24,
2007. John P. Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. Weeks appeared for
Plaintiff.
Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence,
the Court hereby grants the request of Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence
for leave to file an amended answer raising the additional defense of laches.
The Lawrences shall not be required to physically file an amended answer as this

ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ANSWER - 1

v u j L
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order shall serve to authorize the amendment of the Lawrences' answer to raise
the defense of laches.

Dated:

AdI

v

ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ANSWER - 2

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of
,2007,l
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method
indicated below, and addressed as indicated below;
John P, Whelan
213 N. 4" Street
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Fax to (208)664-2240
Susan

P. Weeks

James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

CLERK OF T H E DISTRICT COURT
I\

By:

JVW

PAGE

SUSAX P. W E K S
JPLNES, E R N O N 62 W E K S , P.A.
1875 N, Mewood Dr, Stc. 200
Coeur d'Aiene, ID 838 14
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
F a c ~ ~ l (208)
c : 664-1684
TSB #4255

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DTSTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST +JUDICIALDISTRICT OF Tm

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 'THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 02-767 1
ORDER ALLOWRcTGFOR
SHORTENED T m XN WHICH
TO m A R APPLICATTON

vs.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWEKCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.
Based on Plaintiffs' Moti.on.to Shorten Time, good cause appearing for the same,

IT IS H E E B Y ORDERED that Plaintiffs Application for Sixth Access shall be heard
on October 29- 2007, at the hour of 4 p.m. at the Kootenai County Courthouse. Coeur d'Alene,
Idalio.
DATED this

3 ["

day of October, 2007

JOEN T. MITCHELL

10133
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CERTIFICATE OF SERWCE

I hmby certify that on the

31 day of

200'7, I caused to be servcd a

true and correa copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the follovving:

U.S. Mail

Overnight Mail

Hmd Delivered

Telecopy (FAX)

Susan P. Weeks
James, V m a n 62 Weeks, P.A.
T 875 N. Lakewood Dr., Suite 200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1 6 8 4
John P. Whelan
2 13 N. 4thStreet
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 I./

11/13

PAGE

04/13

STATE OF IOAH0
COUNTY
K O ~ T E H A ~ I S S.
FILED:

SUSAN P.W E K S
J M S , VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1875 N. L&ewood Dr, Ste. 200
Coeur dtAlene. ID 838 14
Telephone: (208) 667-0685
Facsirnilc: (208) 664-1684
ISB M255
Attorneys fot Plaintiff

RV TEE2 DISTFUCT COURT OF TlXE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
S T A E OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNm OF KOOTENM
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Case No. CV 02-7671

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME

VS.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LA W N C E , husband and wife,

I

Defendants.

COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff. and moves the Court for an order shortening
the notice of time to hear Plaintiffs Application for Sixth Access. This motion is made on the
grounds that Plaintiff requested the Court's earliest setting, which did not allow for fourken days

notice.

DATED this 29" day of October, 2007.
JAMES, VERNON & m E K S , P.A.

By

k

'=r-- /
-

/A 7
+
A

SUSAN P. WEEKS

51 9
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I hereby certify that on the 29" day of October, 2007.1 caused to be served a true and
correct copy of

foregoing document by the me&od indicated below, and addressed to the

followhg :

U.S. Mail

Overnight Mail

Hand Del Svmed

Telecopy (FAX)

John P.!&%elan
2 1 3 4thStreet
Coeur d8Alene,ID 83816
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240

MOTION TO S H O R E N TIME: 2

05113
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02/22

STATE OF IDAHO
CoufiiY OF K o o i E H A l l s ~
FILED:

SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS. P.A.
1875 N. Lsikewood Dr, Ste. 200
Goeur dlAene, ID 83 8 3 4
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Facsimile: (208) 664- I684
ISB 64255
Attorneys for Plaintiff

M THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA'I'E OF TDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAJ
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Case No. CV 02-7671
I

Plaintiff,
VS

APPLICATION FOR SIXTH

ACCESS

.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BREHDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney. Susan P. Weeks of the firm
JameS & Vernon & Weeks, P.A., and hereby applies to the Court for a sixth access pursuant to
the Court's previously entered Preliminary Injunction Order. The order required that any

subsequent accesses after the first four required applications to the Court. PlaintiRs tenant
needs access for maintenance and winterization of the equipment on the real property.
DATED this

27

day of October, 2007.

JAMES & VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

SUSAN P.WEEKS
Attorney for plainti@
APPLICATION FOR STXW ACCESS: 1

%d

521

PAGE

1hereby C E R ~ ~that
Y on the ~ 9 &id
' ~of O~ o b e r2007,
,
I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
fnl lowing:
U.S. Mail

!Z?

Ovemight Mai 1

Hand DeIivered

CJ

Telecopy (FAX)

John P.Whelan
213 N.4*' Street
Coeur d3Alene,ID 838 14
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240

APPLICATION FOR SIXTH ACCESS: 2

03/13

STATE OF 113;AHt>

$1
cc

SUSAN P. W E K S
JAMES, VERNON & M E K S , P.A.
1875 N. Lakewood Dr, Stc. 200
Coeur #Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684
TSB #4255
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT C O m T OF THE FIRST SUI)ICIL;U, DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATTNG COMPANY,
a Dclaware corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 02-767 1
ORDER GF&4NTlNG REQUEST
FOR SIXTH ACCESS

VS.
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BMNDA 3.
L A W W C E , husband and wife,

Defendants.

The Court having reviewed the application of Plaintiff and the AEdavit filed in support
tl3ereof; and it apparing that Plaintiff has utilized the four (4) accesses granted by the Caw, and a
sixTh access being requested:

IT TS

ORDERED that Plaintiff may make a sixth access to the property pursuant

to the original Preliminary Injunction Order entered herein. Plaintiff is required to file a Notice of
Access of the date of the sixth access.

DATED this

ORDER GWTING

'7 1

'

+ciay of

6

L +-, 2007.

REQUEST FOR SETH ACCESS: 1

523

PAGE

aRTIFIGATE OF SERVICE:
1hercby certify that on the

day of

OCkf/

2007.1 caused to be served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing docment by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:

13

U.S. Mail

U

Hand Delivered

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon rB, Weeks, P.A.
1875 N. Lakewood Dr.,Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 14
Facsimile: (208) 664-1,684
John P. Whelan
213 N. 4thStreet
Coew d' Alene, ID 838 14 J
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240

ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR STXTFI ACCESS: 2

Ovemight Mail

Telecopy (FAX)

13/13

JOHN P, WMELAN, P.C.
2 1 3 N. 4thStreet
Cot?t.fr d'AIene, ID 8381 4

2007ffOY -2 AH/[: 42,
CLERK DtSTRlCT COURT%<'kn
L-

Tele.: (208) 664-5897
Fax: (208)664-2240

IsBstl6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATINC
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,
CASE NO. CV-02-7671

Plainriff,

OBJECTION T O FORM OF ORDER
GRANTING SIXTH ACCESS

VS.

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

I

Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, object to the form of
the "Order Granting Request for Sixth Access" as follows:

The "Order" references an "AffidavitJffiled in support of Plaintiff's
"application" when, in fact, no such affidavit had been filed in support of
Plaintiff's application. It wou Id appear, therefore, that the order su brnitted
misstates the facts.

OBJECTION TO FORM OF ORDER GRANTING SIXTH ACCESS

-1

DATED:

JOHN P, WWELAN. P.C.

OBJECTION TO FORM OF ORDER GRANTING SIXTH ACCESS - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

d

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2"ay

of November, 2007, 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the fallowing:
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 2 0 0
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

i/ Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684
-~ersonatlyserved
Judge John T. Mitchell
324 Garden Ave.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:

U.5, Mail, postage prepaid

/ Facsimile: (208) 446-1 132
-Personally served

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.G.
2 1 3 N. GCh~ t r c s e r
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8 3 8 14
Tele.: (208) 664-5891

20111 MOY -7 PH 3: I5 <:,-V$
ilERK DISTRICT COUR$b

Fax: (2108) 664-2240
ISB# 6083
IM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,

CASE NO. CV-02-7671
RENEWED MOTION FOR

DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA

J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

I

DATE:
TIME:

JUDGE: JOHN T. MITCHELL

COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by
and through their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motions this
court for an Order for Disqualification for Cause against the Honorable John T.

Mitchell, presiding judge in the above-entitled act.ion. This motion is made on
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE - 1

the ground that Defendants believe the Honorable John T. Mitchell is biased

or

prejudiced against them o r their case in rhis action. Phis motion is made on the
ground of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 40(d)(2).
Defendants request oral argument.

DATED this y h d a y of Navembei, 2007.

Respectfully Submitted,

MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of November, 2007, 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicared below,

and addressed to the following:
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law

1875 N. Lakewaod Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8387 4

- U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

Via:

/

Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

- Personally served
Judge John T. Mitchell
324 W. Garden Ave.

Coeur d' Alent, ID 8381 4
Via:

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

/ Facsimile: (208) 446-1 132
-

-Personally served

STATE 3 1C1Pjll)

ccuin ,LFq:~yp;?l)
xr:

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

ss

2 1 3 N. 4 I h Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
15B# 6083

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,

CASE NO. CV-02-7671

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN
IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED
MOTION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE

vs.

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

HEARlNC DATE:

TIME:
Defendants.

STATE

OF lDAHO

1
)

County of Kootenai

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell

ss.

)

I , John P. Whelan, being firsr duly sworn, deposes and says:

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION F O R
CAUSE - 1

1.

I am the attorney for Defendants, 3ouglas Lawrence and Brenda

Lawrence in the above-entitled case and the case o f Tower Asset Sub inc.

Lawrence, (CV-03-462 1). I have personal knowledge of the following facts and

could competently testify.

2.

1 have previously filed the Affidavit of John P. Whelan filed on June

5,

2007 in support of the Defendant" initial Motian for Disqualification for Cause
and I incorporate herein by reference the factual allegations recited therein.

3.

1 also filed the Amended Supplemental Affidavit of John P. Whelan

(with Exhibit Attached) in suppon of the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration
on ~ u l y24, 2007 and I incorporate herein the factual allegations contained
therein by reference.

4.

In addition, I have previously filed the Affidavit of John P. Whelan in

Support of Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration on July 9, 2007.

5.

1 also filed the Amended Supplemental Affidavit of John P. Whelan

(with Exhibit Attached) in support of the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration
on July 24, 2007 and I incorporate herein the factual allegations conrained

therein by reference.

6.

1 submit this affidavit in support of Defendants' Renewed Motion to

Disqualify t h e Honorable John T. Mirchell for Cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule
40(6)(2).
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR
CAUSE

-2

7.

Since the filing of Defendam's m o t i o n f o r reconsideration of

Defendants' iniriai rnorion for disqualif~catioofor cause, t h e f o l i o w i n g additional

events have; occurred in the herein case:

8.

1 have f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t with t h e l d a h o Judicial C o u n c i l a l l e g i n g that

Judge John T. M i t c h e l l has e n g a g e d in c o n d u c t in t h e h e r e i n acrion t h a t violates

t h e l d a h o Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically C a n o n 1 , Canon 2A, C a n o n 2 6 ,
Canon 3E(l)(a), Cannon 3B(1), Canon 3B(2), 35(4), 3B(5), a n d C a n o n 5 C ( 2 ) .

9.

D u r i n g a p u b l i c h e a r i n g in his c o u r t r o o m on O c t o b e r 31, 2007.

j u d g e Nitchelf accused m e of lying to t h e Court. tie m a d e t h i s allegation w h i l e

my son, Kellen Whelan, was t h e sole spectator in t h e c o u r t r o o m . T h e Judge was
o n t h e b e n c h when I w a l k e d into t h e courtroom with my s o n a n d the Judge h a d a
clear view of t h e persons w a l k i n g in t o the c o u r t r o o m . The Judge accused me of
lying to t h e court in response to a statement I h a d m a d e in the course of

argument t h a t t h e l d a h o Supreme Court had vacated t h e i n j u n c r i o n t h a t Judge

M i t c h e l l had issued in t h i s case w h e n h e entered summary j u d g m e n t in the case
against my c l i e n t (See Capsmr Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence, 1 43 l d a h o
704, 1 5 2 P.3d 575 (2007))~'1 correct/yand t r u t h f u l l y r e p r e s e n t e d the facts to

Judge Mitchell granted summary judgmenr to Plaintiff in chis action by an order
June 7, 2005. The same order quieted rlrle in favor of Plaintiff and created a permanent
injunction restraining Defendant from interfering wlth Plaintiff's use of Defendants' land.

dated

Additionally, the order specifically recited that "any bond posted in conjunction with the
temporary restraining order entered herein is hereby released," This order was appealed to the

ldaho Supreme Court. The ldaho Supreme Court vacated the order granting summary
Judgment. By vacating the arder granting summary judgment, the ldaho Supreme Court
vacated the permanent injunction recited therein.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION F O R
CAUSE

-3

Judge Mirchel!: the injunction was, in fact, vacated when the Supreme Court

vacated rhe order that created the permanent injunction.

Judge Mitchell's

accusation (in front of my son) that I was a liar was a gross breach of decorum
and clearly inappropriate. The accusation is evidence of the Judge's bias and
prejudice against me and, therefore, my clients.

10.

Three days prior to the October 31, 2007 hearing where Judge

Mitchell cailed me a liar, counsel for Plainriff, Susan Weeks, flled an application
for an order shortening time and a Motion for Sixth Access [sic]. Neither motion
was supported by an affidavit and neither motion referenced a rule basis for the

motion as required by 1.R.C.P Rule ?(b)(l), At the hearing, I objected to the
"application" and the "motion" on the grounds that no supporting affidavit was
filed and no rule basis was cited,

1 argued that Plaintiff had failed to

demonstrate grounds for a order shortening time.

My objections were

summarily overruled. I further argued that the bond that had been ordered and
posted for the temporary restraining order issued early on in this case had been
exonerated by the Court's June 7, 2005 order granting summary judgment,
therefore no bond was in place (as Plaintiff had recovered the bond on May 3,
2006). 1 funher argued that, at a minimum, a bond should be ordered posted

by Plaintiff to replace the bond exonerated,

The argument was summarily

dismissed by Judge Mitchell even though I.R.C.P. 65(c) mandates that "no
restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHEL4N IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFIaTION FOR
CAUSE

-4
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security by the applicanr. judge Mitchell has seemingly refused to follow rhe

law.'
11.

It is abundantly clear that Judge Mitchell applies a d i f f e r e n t srandard

of conduct t o Plaintiff's counsel than he applies to your affiancI3 as both the

Application for O r d e r Shortening Time and the M o t i o n f o r S i x ~ hAccess [sic] was
granted without c i t i n g a n y r u l e basis.

12.

On

October 31, 2007, Plaintiff's

counsel s u b m i t t e d a n order t o

Judge Mitchell enrirled "Order Granting Request For Sixth Access."

The order

referenced that "the C o u r t having reviewed t h e application o f Plaintiff .and t h e

affidavit in s u ~ ~ o thereof.
rt
.." (emphasis added). In fact. no affidavit had been
f i l e d in support of PlaintiFf's application, a p o i n t argued by y o u r affiant.

When

y o u r affiant received t h e signed order. an "Objection t o F o r m of Order Granting
Sixth Access" was f i l e d on November 2, 2007, the. very day that your affiant f i r s t

saw the signed order. Apparently, n o action has been taken to correct t h e false
reference in the Court order. Again, it w o u l d appear that Judge Mitchell applies

The findings required by I.R.C.P. Rule 65(d) also were not in the order granting sixth

access, which was essenrially a mandarory injunction. The Rule 6S(d) findings were not in the
original preliminary injunction order either.
3

See Affidavit of John P, Whelan f i l e d June 5 , 2007. In the case of Srraub v. Smith,

Judge Mitchell denied John P, Whelan's prevailing cllent anorney fees pursuant
to a standard real estate purchase contract containing an attorney fee clause because John P.
Whelan had allegedly failed t o reference a rule (1.R.C.P) basis for hls motion. In fact, a rule basis
was sited and Judge Mitchell apparently did not read the motion before denying iT.
(CV-04-5437),

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR
CAUSE - 5

"".'

a double standard when it comes to misrepresentations to the Courr made by
Plaintiff's counsel. A true and correct copy of the order is attached as Exhibit A.'

13. Lasrly, Judge Mitchell scheduled both the
7671) and the Tower Asset case (CV-03-4621)

scheduling order.

It i s my understanding that

Capsrar case (CV-02-

for trial wirhour issu~nga

of the Judges In the First

District routinely issue scheduling orders in every civil case.

The absence of

scheduling orders tn the cases at hand seemingly benefits t h e Plaintiffs, and
Plaintiff's counsel, in each case in that Plaintiff' does not have to disclose the
witness and evidence disclosures required in all other civil cases in the First
District, thus the Defendants in this case are placed at a distinct disadvantage.
None of the time deadlines established by the routine scheduling order utilized
byjudge Mitchell apply to the Plaintiff in this case.

14,

1 believe that Judge Mitchell i s biased and prejudiced against

Defendants's counsel, your affiant, and that disqualification for cause i s
warranted by I.R.C.P. Rule 40(d)(2). I also believe that the Judge's impartiality i s
reasonably questioned in this case and that the Judge has failed t o follow
accepted rules of decorum. I also believe that the following Judicial Canons have
been violated by fudge Mitchell: Canon 1 , Canon 2A, Canon 2 8 , Canon 3E(l )(a),

Cannon 36(1), Canon 3B(2), 3B(4), 38(5), and Canon SC(2).

The Coun is requested t o take notice of the judicial records referred to h e r e i n a s well
as t h e Court Clerk records regarding t h e exoneration of t h e bond p o s ~ e dby Plaintiff.
4
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DATED this r d t d a y o f November, 2007.

JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C.

Subscribed and sworn before me this

7*

-

day of November, 2007.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHEIAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALlFlCATlON FOR
CAUSE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

7T4day of November, 2007,

1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,

and addressed to the following-

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks

Attorneys at taw
1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4

Via:

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
I/

Facsimile: ( 2 0 8 ) 664-1 684

-Personally served
Judge John T, Mitchell
3 2 4 W. Garden Ave?.

Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

/Facsimile:
-

(208)446-1 132

Personally served

J
Jes ca Tvrdy

STATE OF IDAI-IC)

SUSAN P.WEEKS
liAmS, ZJFRYfaTJ% WEKS, P.A.
1875 N. L a k m d Dr,S t e 2200
Goeur d'Alme, I
D 838 14
Teic~hoae;1208)657-WX3
Faat;zmila; (208) 664-1 684
'lSB #4255

llcr THE DTSTRICT COURT OF TFIE FRST m I C I h t DISTRICT OF T'HE
STAm OF IDAHO, Fii A7TD FOR TEE COWTY OF KOOENAI

CAPSTAX.RADIO OPERAnNG COWANY,
a Ddawar~corporation,

h

e No.. CV 02-7671

OmER G
REQUEST
FOR SIXTH ACCESS
vs.

DOUGLAS LAtvRBNCE a d BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, hwband and wife,

The Court having, m i d the applicat& of P l H and the Amdavit filed in support
t l ~ e n u and
t it a p p d g that Plaintiff has utilized fhc four (4) acecases grmtod by the C o w and a

sixth access bchg requestad:
IT TS E,FU%Y O R D m that flMff may nake n s j , d access ta the property pursuant
to

the original IP~lMraiyIajunctimO d m en-

berein. P b t i f f is q u i d to file a Notice o f

Access of the date of the sixth access.

DATED this ,?1 stday~f

6

,L

2007.

t

,
,

day o f

true and conect copy of the foregoing documeot by the method indicatd below, and addressed
to the fogadfig:

U.S. -Mail

Ovcmj,ghtikfd

Telccopy (FAX)
Susm P.W ~ a
James, V m o n & Weeks, PA.
1875 N.Lakewood Dr,,
guitc 200
Coeur dFAbne,ID 83814
Fassimilc: (208)664-1684

1

John P. Pmefan
213 N, 4" Strrt=t
C a m d7Altnc,LL)53814 J
Facsimile: (208)664-2240

JOHN P. VIHEMN, P.C.
2 1 3 N. 4thSrreet
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4

Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax; ( 2 0 5 ) 664-2240

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING

CASE NO. CV-02-7671

COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff,

RENEWED MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM
AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

vs.
DATE: November 27, 2007
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife,

TINE:

3 : 3 0 p.m.

JUDGE: JOHN T, MITCHELL

Defendants.

CONES NOW t h e Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by
and through their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motions this
court, pursuant to Rules 12(a) and 12(b) of the Idaho Appellate Rules for an

Order for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, Defendants request

RENEWED

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

-1

an Order granting rbem permission ta appeal if Defendants' Renewed Notron for
Disqualification for C a u s e i s denied.

This motion is made an the grounds that goad cause was shown for the
renewed motion f o r disqualificatian, and Defendants' believe that t h e y cannot
obtain a fair t r i a l from Judge John T. Mitchell. The matter i s scheduled for trial

on December 7 0, 2007, therefore Defendants' request is an urgent request,
Defendants request o r a l argument.

DATED this

1

day of November, 2007.

Respecrfully Subrnirred, ,

MOTION FOR PERMlSSlON TO APPEAL FROM AN \NTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 2

d

I HEREBY CERTIFY rhar on the ( Z day of November, 2007, 1 caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the faregoing by the method indicated below,

and addressed to the following:

Susan P, Weeks
James, Vernon &I Weeks
Attorneys at Law

1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suiitc 200
Coeur d' Aleme, ID 8381 4
U.5, Nail, postage prepaid

Via:
t/

Facsimile: (7108)664-1 684
Personally served

SUSAN P. lYEEKS
JANIES?VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coew d'hlme, n) 338 14
Telephone: (208) 667-0633
TSB #255

Attorneys for Plaintiff

N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN A I D FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CAPSTAR RADlO OPERATING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Case No. CV 02-7671

RESPONSE TO SECOND
MOTTON TO DISQUALIFY

Plaintiff,

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BFlENDA J.
L A m m G E , husband and wife,

Defendants.

1

STANDARD FOR MOTION' TO DISQUALIFY
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 40(d)(2)(A)(4) 'bDisqualificationfor cause" provides

that: "(A) Grounds. Any party to a.n action nay disqualify a judge or magistrate for cause from
presiding in any action upon any of the following grounds: ... @]hatthe judge or ,magistrateis
biased or prejudiced for or against any party or the case in the action." Orders on motions to
disqualify are evaluated according to abuse-of-discretion rules. Samuel v. Heporth, Nungester
& Lezamiz, Iptc., 134 Idaho 84, 88,996 P.2d 303,307 (2000).

ARGWIENT

RESPONSE TO SECOND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY:1

Defendants' counsel claims that the ma1 iudge is prejudiced against Defendants' case
bccausc thcir attorney ~ a c e i v e that
s the judge beats him disparately. The new facts that counscl
provides in support of the renewed motion asc: ( I ) Dcfmdmts counst.11has filed a judicial

complaint against the trial judge based upon actions in the present case; (2) no scheduling order
was issued in either Capstau Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, Kootenai County Case Na. GV-

02-7671 or l"nwer Asset Sub 1). Lawrence, Kootenai County Case No. CV-03-4621; (3) the judge

allegedly calld counsel a liar in h n t of his son; and (4) the Court applies a different standard to
plaintiffs counsel based upon an order entered by the Court.
Althou& the Court has previously noted that it has made rulings both in favor and
against Defendant's counsel, Defendant's counsel continues to claim that hjs perception that the
trial judge has animosity toward him which prejudices his client. Plaintiff is not in a position to
look into the subjective mind of the court and answer such allegation. However, from an
objective point of view, plaintiff has not observed those things of which Dcfendant's counsel
complains. Thae was a scheduIing order issued in Case No. CV-02-7671 on December 12,
2003. There was not one issued in Case No. CV-03-462 1. Plaintiff's counsel has observed this

oversight in other cases by other judges. It has been her practice to notify the court clerk when
there is such an oversight. If Defendants felt this oversight in Casc No. CV-03-4621prejudiced

them, they certainly were aware oF this fact and had every opportunity to bring it to the court's

attention. Objectively, an oversight (which may well have occurred long before Mr. Whelnn was
the attorney of record) docs not establish prejudice on the part of the court.

RESPONSE TO SECOND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY: 2

Deferldmts are correct that the order preser~tedby Plintiff for thc Sixth Access
referenced rtn affidavit \when no such affidavit was presented snd the Court signed it. The order
was rnodeled after a previous order and should have been modified. The failure tct rnodifjr it was

the fault ofplaintifrs counsel. not the court. However. this fact alone is not indicative that the

court is prejudiced against Defendant or treats the plaintiffs counsel better than defendant. In
fact, the same situation occurred when Defendants presented their ordn on judicial notice. The
order p r e s a t d by Defmdants and cntercd by the court on Septe-mber 11,2007 was not
consistent with the ruling made in court. Plaintiff brought a motion ta conect the judgment as
allowed by the rules. Defendant is afforded the same opportunity. The mere fact that an order
was presented and subsequently entered that was inconsistent with the ruling i s not indicative of

prejudice by the Court toward the presenting counsel. If it was, the logical conclusion in this
matter is that the trial court is prejudiced against both parties because it has entered orders for
conclusion that this court will rule in
both that wmc incorrect, which leads to the ~~onsensical

neither parbes favor and both parties favor.
As to the claim that the court called MI. Whelm a liar, both plaintiff's counsel and the
court disagreed with Mr. Whelm's characterization of the Supreme Court's opinion. However,

plaintiff's counsel does not recollect the court calling Mr. Whelan a liar. Plaintiffs counsel's
recollect was that the court indicated that Mr. Whelan was not being truthfi.11 when he
represented that the Supreme Court revmscd the preliminary injunction when it remanded the
matter. However, the record is the better source for reference on this matter.

RESPONSE TO SECOND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY: 3

Perhaps Mr. me1an.s perceptions me shaped by his own internal vicxvs. PlaiatifPs

co~inseIdoes not perceive the tsansgcssions pcrccived by Mr. %%elan.
DATED this 20th day of Novmbm, 200'7.
JAMES, VEKqON & WEEKS, P.A.

B
SUSAN P.WEEKS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVJCE

1h a b y certify that on the 20'~day of Novcmbn, 2007, I caused to be sewed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing donunent by the method indicated below, and addressed to the

following:
U.S. Mail

D

Overnight Mail

Hand Delivacd

lzf

Telecopy (FAX)

John P. Whelan
213 4"' Street
Coe~rrd'Alene, ID 83 8 1 6
Facsimile: (208)664-2240

RESPONSE TO SECOND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY: 4
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

TOWER ASSET, INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

)
)
)

case NO.

CV 2003 4621

1
Plaintigs,
)
)

1
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
RENEWED MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, I.A.R. 12

1
1

)
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,)
a Delaware Corporation,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
VS.
1

1
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants.
1

Case NO.

CV 2002 7671

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
RENEWED MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, I.A.R. 12

I. BACKGROUND.
On November 13,2007, Defendants Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Lawrences)
filed a "Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an Interlocutory Order" in each of
the above cases. The interlocutory order sought to be appealed was an interlocutory
order that did not exist as of November 13, 2007. In their motion, Lawrences "request an
Order granting them permission to appeal ZDefendants' Renewed Motion for

548

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN
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Disqualification for Cause is denied." Motion for Permission to Appeal From an
Interlocutory Order, pp. 1-2. (emphasis added). On November 7, 2007, Lawrences filed

a "Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause" in each of the above cases. That
Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause was not heard until November 27, 2007.
After oral argument by counsel for all parties on November 27,2007, the Lawrences'
Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause was denied on the record, and the
reasons for that denial were stated on the record. After the denial of the Lawrences'
Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause, this Court heard oral argument on
Lawrences' Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. That
matter was taken under advisement. Thus, though prematurely filed on November 13,
2007, Lawrences' Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order
is now at issue.
The reason this is Lawrences "Renewed" Motion for Permission to Appeal From an
lnterlocutory Order, is back on July 9, 2007, Lawrences filed their Motion for Permission
to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order, in which they requested "an Order granting them
permission to appeal the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion for
Disqualification for Cause, I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) filed June 25, 2007." Motion for Permission
to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order, pp. 1-2. That motion was denied on the record at
oral argument on August 6, 2007.
Since the Lawrences furnished no briefing in support of their Renewed Motion for
Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order, the Court took the Lawrences'
Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order under advisement
on November 27, 2007, so that it could review the briefing regarding the Lawrences' initial
Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. A review of the Court file

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN
I * I T C n l nPI I T n D Y

nOnCD

Paae 2

shows there was no brleflng flled at the earl~errnotton elther The Court has revlewed the

reasons set forth on the record for the dental of the Lawrences' lnltial Motton for
Permlsslon to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. Those same reasons apply to the
Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an Interlocutory Order. Those reasons
are as follows

11, ANALYSIS.
ldaho Appellate Rule 12 is a discretionary rule, allowing that permission to appeal
an interlocutory order "may" be granted, but only when certain things exist. ldaho
Appellate Rule 12 requires two things, at least the first of which must exist in order for a
trlal court to grant a motion for permission to appeal an interlocutory order. The order
must first involve "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for
difference of opinion" and second, "an immediate appeal from the order.. .may materially
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." I.A.R. 12(a). (italics added). This Court
Interprets the second criteria as not a requirement, but a factor to be considered by the
trial court in its discretion.
At the August 6, 2007 hearing, this Court commented that there was no issues of
controlling case law that were articulated by the Lawrences in their motion to disqualify.
That is again the case following the November 27, 2007 hearing on Lawrences' Renewed
Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. The Lawrences furnished
no case law on the issue of disqualification, nor on the issue of permissive appeal. On
the issue of disqualification, the Court cited on the record several cases it had reviewed
as to why it was denying the renewed motion for disqualification. While these cases cited
support both granting and denying a motion for disqualification, the reason is they are
naturally fact driven.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN
I~.LTTDL
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Even if this Court could get beyond the lack of an issue of controlling case law as
to whlch there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion, from a practical standpoint,
an immediate appeal from this Court's decisions on renewed motions for disqualification
would not "materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." If this Court later
rules in favor of Lawrences on summary judgment (both cases now have pending
motions for summary judgment brought by defendants in each case) in each case, and
the cases proceed to trial, and Lawrences prevail at trial, the Lawrences would be unlikely
to have any incentive to appeal this Court's decisions regarding their motions to
disqualify. If this Court later rules in favor of Lawrences on summary judgment in both
cases, but against Lawrences at trial in Capstar and a jury rules against Lawrences at trial
in TowerAsset, then the Lawrences could appeal the rulings on the motions to disqualify
as well as any other issue they would like, including issues that may arise during the trials
now scheduled about six months from the date of this decision. If this Court later rules
against Lawrences on summary judgment in these cases, then the Lawrences can appeal
that decision and appeal the rulings on the motions to disqualify as well as the rulings on
summary judgment.
Ill. ORDER.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that in the exercise of this Court's discretion, for the
reasons set forth above, defendants' Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an
Interlocutory Order in Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and identical motion filed in

Tbwer Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621, are DENIED.
Entered this J p d a y

of November, 2007.

T'

&&L-

ell, District Judge

-----
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Certificate of Service
day of November, 2007, a true copy of the foregoing was
I certify that on the
mailed postage prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail or facsimile to each of the following
Lawyer
Fax #
i Lawyer
Fax #
John P Whelan
208 664-2240
Susan Weeks
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County of KOOTENAI
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)
)
)
Pain tiffs,
)
)
VS.
)
)
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )
)
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
)
Defendants.
1

TOWER ASSET SUB, INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

case NO.

CV 2003 4621

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, AND ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO SUBSTITUTE REAL P A R N IN
INTEREST

1
)
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,)
a Delaware Corporation,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
VS .
)
)
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case NO.

CV 2002 7671'

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

I. BACKGROUND.
Although one decision is being filed in each of these two cases, these two cases
are not consolidated. At the November 27, 2007, hearing on various motions in both
cases, counsel for defendants in each of these two cases indicated on the record that he
would be pursuing a motion to consolidate on behalf of his clients. No such motion has
been filed. Although one decision is filed in each of these two cases, this decision will

553

d~scusseach case separately
At the conclus~onof the November 27, 2007, hearlng, thls Court stated that the

rul~ngon the upcoming summary judgment rnotlon (heard November 28, 2007) would be
taken under adv~sementand that the decislon on summary judgment would not be issued
until after this Court filed its decision on "Defendant's Renewed Motion for Permission to
Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, I.A.R. 12". This Court entered its "Memorandum
Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal from
an Interlocutory Order, I.A.R. 12" on November 30,2007. On December 17,2007,
defendants in both cases filed a "Motion for Permissive Appeal" with the ldaho Supreme
Court. On January 25, 2008, this Court received notice that on January 17, 2008, the
ldaho Supreme Court denied defendants' Motion for Permissive Appeal in each of these
two cases. Accordingly, summary judgment in each of these two cases is at issue.
Oral argument on the summary judgment motion brought by plaintiffs in both cases
was heard November 28,2007.
Capstar Radio Operating Company and Tower Sub Asset (collectively the
"Plaintiffs") filed suit to declare the existence of an easement over property owned by
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence, the defendants in each of the two cases. Due to a
discovery dispute, summary judgment was limited to only the issue of express
easement. Oral argument on the express easement theory was heard in these two
cases at two different times. This Court granted summary judgment in favor of Tower
Asset Sub against Lawrences on May 27, 2005, and this Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Capstar against Lawrences on June 7, 2005. Lawrences appealed
this Court's finding of an express easement in both cases to the ldaho Supreme Court.
On January 26, 2007, the ldaho Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment in both
cases and remanded to this Court "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."

Capstar v Labvrence, 2007 Oprnron No 13,p 7, Tower Asset Sub,Inc. v Lawrence,
2007 Oprnion No. 14, p. 7. The Supreme Court noted that although the plaintiffs did not

have an express easement, it appeared that the case might have been concluded on
summary judgment based upon the plaintiffs' other theories. The ldaho Supreme Court
wrote in Capstar: ''It is unfortunate that the district court confined the summary
judgment proceeding to the express easement issue, as it appears the case might have
been brought to a conclusion based on evidence that was submitted with respect to
Capstar's other theories but not considered on summary judgment." Capstar v.

Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 1 3 , p. 7 . A similar statement was made by the ldaho
Supreme Court in TowerAsset Sub, lnc.:
Final resolution of this case would have been expedited, had the district
court not confined its inquiry to the express easement issue. Based on
evidence submitted to the court, certain of the other theories showed
greater promise from Tower's standpoint and it is unfortunate that those
theories were not fully developed and decided upon.

TowerAssef Sub, lnc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 7. On May 14, 2007, the
plaintiffs in each case filed a "Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment", which again
raised for this Court's consideration the other theories of easement advanced in
plaintiffs' previous motions for summary judgment, but not decided upon by this Court in
its initial decisions on summary judgment in 2005.

11. ANALYSIS REGARDING CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING CO. v. LAWRENCE.
A. Facts Pertaining to Capstar Radio Operating Co., v. Lawrence.
Blossom Mountain is located south of Post Falls, Idaho. The Lawrences and
Capstar own parcels of property on Blossom Mountain. Both the Capstar parcel and
the Lawrences' parcel (Lawrence parcel) were once part of a larger tract held under
common ownership by Harold and Marlene Funk. The Lawrence parcel was broken out

in 1975 when Funks sold that parcel to Human Synerg~st~cs
(Aff~dav~t
of Susan Weeks
1r-i

Support of Mot~onfor Surnmaryl Judgment, p 2, il1 e , Exhibit E), and the Capstar

parcel was broken out in 1989 when Funks so\d that parcel to Kootenai Broadcasting,
Inc. (Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion far Summary Judgment, p. 5, 73.3,
Exhibit Q). The Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and
the Capstar parcel is located to the east of the Lawrences' parcel in the southwest
quarter of Section 22. Section 21 iies directly west of Section 22. Affidavit of Susan
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7, 7 8, Exhibit Z. There is a
public road in the area known as Signal Point Road. Signal Point Road lies generally to
the west of the Lawrence parcel, which in turn is west of Capstar's parcel. Capstar
seeks an easement to access its property from Signal Point Road over an unimproved
private road commonly known as Blossom Mountain Road. Blossom Mountain Road
crosses through the Lawrence parcel before passing near the Capstar parcel. In
litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition taken September 30,
2003, recognized the right of way easement General Telephone Corporation (GTC)
obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22 over the private road
that crossed the southwest quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel). Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-7, m 5 - 7 , Exhibit W,

X and Y. The detail of the access road prepared by GTC's engineer in 1967 shows the
road leaves Signal Point Road, then travels southeast through the southwest portion of
Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then enters the north half of Section 28 were it then
turned northeast and entered the southeast quarter of Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and
Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y
Capstar and Tower Asset have proven the following chain of title for the parcels
E,

involved in Sections 21 and 22:

r. /-

J 3 L.1

I Reynolds to the Radens and t h e Mareos (Contract rn 1968,Deed In 1974).
A.fFrdavrl of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17,20041, Exh~bitsA and

D

Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support

of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits A
and D.
2. Radens and Marcos to Funk (Contract in 1969, Deed in 1974): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed
August 17,2004), Exhibits B and C. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits B and C.
To this point there was unity of title in the portions of Sections 21 and 22 at issue in this
case.
Capstar and Tower Asset have established the title chain with respect to what
became the Lawrence property located in the southeast quarter of Section 21 as:
1. Funk to Human Synergistics (Sale Agreement in 1975, Deed in 1992):
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed November 2,2004), E and I; Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and F; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibit A and F.
2. Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh (Contract and Deed May 16,
1977): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17,2004), Exhibits F and H;

Aff~davltof Susan Weeks In Suppod of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004).Exhib~tsF and H
3 Johnston & McHugh to N.A.P. (Sale Agreement October 6, 1987, Deed July
16. 1996) Affidavit of Susan Weeks In Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits G and 0;
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits G and 0.
4 N.A.P. to Farmanian (Deeds June 28, 1996 and July 8, 1996)): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits J and K; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibits J and K.
5. Farmanian to Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Sale Agreement July 12, 1996,

Deed July 5, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits L, M,
N and P; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits L, M, N and P.
Capstar establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Capstar property in
the southwest corner of Section 22 as:
1. Funk to Kootenai Broadcasthg (Deed September 22, 1989): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case
filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits Q and R.

2 Kootena~Broadcast~ngto Rook Broadcasting (Deed October 25, 1993)'
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004) Exhibrt S

3 Rook Broadcasting to AAGM (Deed November 20, 1998): Affidavit of Susan
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed
March 9, 2004), Exhibit T.
4. AGM to Capstar (Deed October 25, 2000): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibit U.
Capstar asserts that prior to the separation by the Funks of the Lawrences'
parcel from the parent parcel in 1975, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had
been used by the Funks as the exclusive means to access their property in Sections 21
and 22. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed March 9,
2004), pp. 4-5,

77 7-9.

Capstar asserts that even after the separation of Section 21, the

Funks continued to use the private easement road to access their Section 22 parcel.
Id., pp. 5-6, 77 10-12. Capstar argues the road was also later used by Kootenai

Broadcasting, lnc, for access to its segregated parcel in Section 22. This claim is
proven by the Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
March 9, 2004. John Rook was the President of Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. Rook's
testimony is uncontroverted.
The chain of title as to both the Lawrence parcel and the Capstar parcel is set
forth in the Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
March 9, 2004, and attached exhibits thereto. In 1975, the Funks agreed to sell the
Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc. In 1992, the Funks gave Human
Synergistics a warranty deed that stated it was "given in fulfillment of those certain
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contracts between the parties hereto dated July 1 , I975 and cond~tlonedfor the
conveyance of the above described property

"

Thrs property passed through several

other hands before the Lawrences purchased ~tin 1996
When the Lawrences questroned Capstar's right to access its property over the
portion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed their property, Capstar filed suit on
November 7, 2002, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Tower Asset filed a similar
suit on June 27,2003. Capstar and Tower Asset sought to have an easement declared
based on four theories: express easement, easement by implication, easement by
necessity, and prescriptive easement. On plaintiffs' previous motion for summary
judgment, this court found that plaintiffs held an express easement over the Lawrence
property based on the sale agreement, as well as the deed. The Court did not address
Capstar's other theories. The Lawrences appealed from that decision and the Supreme
Court reversed summary judgment holding the deed did not create an express
easement over the Lawrence property. On remand, the plaintiffs renew their motion for
summary judgment based on the other theories of easement previously advanced by
Capstar.
B. Easement by Implication from Prior Use.

An easement can be formed by implication from prior use. Creation of
easements by implication rests upon exceptions to the rule that written instruments
speak for themselves, and because implied easements are contrary to that rule, the
courts disfavor them. Sutton v. Brown, 91 ldaho 396, 400, 422 P.2d 63, 67 (1966);
Cordwell v. Smith, 105 ldaho 71, 77, 665 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Ct. App. 1983). An

easement is implied because it is presumed that if an access was in use at the time of
severance it was meant to continue. Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 105 ldaho 535,
542, 681 P.2d 1010, 1017 (Ct. App. 1984). Easements by implication rest on the view

SoC

that land should not be rendered unfit for use due to a lack of access. Id.

In order to establish an easement by ~mplicat~on
from prior use, the party
attempting to estabiish such easement must prove 3 ) unity of title or ownership and
subsequent separation by grant of the domrnant estate; 2) apparent continuous use;
and 3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the
dominant estate. Bear Island Water Association v. Brown, 125 ldaho 717, 725, 874
P.2d 528, 536 (1994); Cordwell v. Smith, 105 ldaho 71, 77, 665 P.2d 1081, 1087
(Ct.App 1983); Close v. Rensick, 95 ldaho 72, 76, 501 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1972); Davis
v. Gowen, 83 ldaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d. 403, 406-07. See also Phillips Industries, Inc.

v. Firkins, 121 ldaho 693, 698, 827 P.2d 706, 71 1 (Ct. App. 1992); and Davis v.
Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367 (1999). Apparent continuous use
refers to the use before the separation of the parcels that would indicate the roadway
was intended to provide permanent access to the parcels. Cordwell, 105 ldaho at 78,
665 P.2d at 1088. The party seeking to establish the easement has the burden of
providing the facts to establish the easement. Id., 105 ldaho at 77, 665 P.2d at 1087.
In Davis v. Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 641-42, 991 P.2d 362, 366-67 (1999), the ldaho
Supreme Court held that successors in interest to the original grantors of property could
assert easement rights by implied or prior use.
Strict necessity is not required for the creation of an implied easement by prior
use. All that is required is reasonable necessity. Davis v. Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 991
P.2d 362 (1999); Thomas v. Madsen, 142 ldaho 635, 132 P.3d 392 (2006).
Reasonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity required for
an easement implied by necessity. Davis, 133 ldaho at 642. Furthermore, the
easement by implication is not extinguished if the easement no longer exists or is no

longer reasonably necessary Id at 643 The Idaho Supreme Court further noted in
Davis:
This long standing rule is based on the theory that when someone
conveys property. they also intend to convey whatever is required for the
beneficial use and enjoyment of that property, and intends to retain all that
is required for the use and enjoyment of the land retained. Consequently,
an easement implied by prior use is a true easement of a permanent
duration, rather than a temporary easement which exists only as long as
the necessity continues. See, e.g., Norken v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622,
631 (Alaska 1991); Thompson v. Schuh, 286 Or. 201, 593 P.2d 1138,
1145 (1979); Story v. Hefner, 540 P.2d 562, 566 (Okla.1975). Additionally,
an implied easement by prior use is appurtenant to the land and therefore
passes with all subsequent conveyances of the dominant and servient
estates. See Hughes v. State, 80 ldaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1958); I.C. §
55-603 (stating that a transfer of real property also includes all easements
attached to the property).

Id.
There can be no dispute that the first element has been proven. As to use and
reasonable necessity, Harold Funk testified in his affidavit that when he and his wife
Marlene purchased parts of Section 21 and 22 in 1969, there was "an existing private
easement road used for access that crossed the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 and
entered into the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 and provided access to these two
parcels and access to the General Telephone Company parcel [GTC owned about one
acre in Section 221." Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 2,

I n 2-3.

This is the same easement road referenced in the Real Estate

Contract between Funks and their predecessor in interest, the Radens, over which
General Telephone Company had a recorded easement for access. Id. p. 2, 7 3,
Exhibit A. This was the Funks only access into Section 21. Id. p. 3, 7 4. When Funks
sold their portion of Section 21 to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor) in
1975, Funks still owned their land in Section 22, and the sales agreement to Human
Synergistics included "Item 5" in the Sales Agreement that "...indicated that the Section

L A 4

21 parcel was belng sold subject to an ~ngressiegresseasement over the existing road
on the property that was being sold to Human Synergistics." Id p 3.

6 Wlthout

those terms Funks' Sectron 21 property would have been landlocked, and that was not
Harold Funk's intent. Id. Harold Funk testified that following the sale [to Human
Synergistics], we continuously utilized the existing road in Section 21 to access Funks'
property in Section 22.. Id. p. 4, 7. 6. That Sales Agreement was recorded as well. Id.
In 1989 Funks sold part of their Section 22 property to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc.,
and Funks knew Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. was going to use that parcel for
construction of a broadcasting tower. Id. p. 4, 7 8. Rook testified that he used this road
several times to access the Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. parcel. Affidavit of John Rook
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, 7 4.
Apparent continuous use from no later than 1975 is also shown by the Affidavit
of Wynn Wenker. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment filed March 9, 2004, Exhibit FF at 710. The Farmanian - Mack Agreement
and Quit Claim Deed attached also infers that there is a road across the Section 21
property, the Farmanian property at that time. Id. Exhibit EE. Harold Funk's Affidavit
indicates that the road subject to this action is the only road onto the property. Affidavit
of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2,

77 3, 4.

Harold

Funk further indicates that it was their intent to include an easement in the transfer to
Human Synergistics so the property in Section 22 would not be landlocked. Id. 7 6.
Similarly, John Rook's Affidavit states that when Kootenai Broadcasing purchased from
the Funks (at a later time in 1989), this road that is subject of this dispute was the only
access to the property now held by Capstar. Affidavit of John Rook in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment,

7 6.
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Capstar noticed thherr Motion far Summary Judgment to be heard on April 14.
2004 Just prior to that hearing, Lawrences pro se made discovery motions related to

rnformatron Rook a n d Funk had. Because such discovery was not relevant to the
express easement theory, discovery was allowed and Capstar's motion for summary
judgment proceeded on the express easement theory alone. The ldaho Supreme Court
has ruled on that issue. On March 23, 2004, Lawrences pro se filed Defendants
Lawrences Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. In that
pleading Lawrences claim, with a reference to a Metzker Map, that Capstar has access
to its parcel via Mellick Road. Defendants Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to Plaitiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. On April 6, 2004, Capstar filed an Affidavit of
Kelvin Brownsberger, the Road Supervisor for Post Falls Highway District. He testified
in his affidavit that Post Falls Highway District has not constructed and maintained
Mellick Road beyond its entry into Section 15, well short of Section 21 or Section 22.
Even if Lawrences had created an issue of fact as to an alternate route (they have not),
the ldaho Supreme Court in Davis v. Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367
(1999) held only "reasonable necessity" is needed for an easement by implication, not
strict necessity which is needed in an implied easement by necessity.
Lawrences made one other argument in Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 16-17. Lawrences claim Wilber Mead
testified he kept his gate locked from1966 until 1998, that the only party that had a key
to the gate was General Telephone Company, that Mead granted Funks an easement
in 1972 and that Funks moved to American Falls in 1975; thus, Funks could have only
used the property for three years instead of the requisite five. Id. Lawrences cite to the
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Defendants Lawrences' Reply in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit H, but no such
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documen"rxrsts

Only the cover page of Douglas Lawrence's Affldavlt

IS

filed

Capstar argues that Mead only stated "to his knowledge" Mr Funk was not using
the road that Mead rndrcates he gave a key to GTE, but Mead has no knowledge as to

whether GTE gave a copy of the key to Funk or any knowledge that Funk did not go
around the gate Capstar also argues there is no evidence to support Lawrences's

allegation that Funks moved to American Falls in 1975 Plaintiff's Reply Brief in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4.
In Capstar's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment filed May 14, 2007, Capstar reiterates the same facts, law and arguments it
made in 2004. Lawrences, through their attorney, filed their "Opposition of Douglas and
Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff' on July 24, 2007. In
that brief, Lawrences essentially argue that since Funks had no right to cross Section
28 (Section 28 lies immediately to the south of Section 22 in which Lawrences' parcel is
contained and Blossom Mountain Road dips from Section 22, down to Section 28,
before reaching Section 21), they have no right to cross Blossom Mountain Road as it
crosses Lawrences' land. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 4-5. Capstar correctly notes that in this lawsuit the
owner of Section 28 is not a party. Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 7. Capstar's access, or lack thereof, over the portion of
Blossom Mountain Road as it travels through Section 28 is simply not an issue before
this Court. Finally, Lawrences again argue Capstar and their predecessor Funk had the
ability to access their land via Mellick Road. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda
Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 6. On August 2, 2007,
Capstar filed "Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment". Capstar correctly points out that nothing in Bruce Anderson's Affidavit
- - -. ---

-...... .-.. ...-,...-.,-

.,"..,r
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(Attached as Exhibit

D to the Affidavrt of Do~lglasLawrence filed July 24, 2007), nothing

in the Viewer's Report and nothing in Loudin v Sfokes (a 1987 District Court decision
by District Judge Gary M Haman whrch shows it was related to Section 15 and Mellick
Road, Exhibit C to Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary
Judgment filed July 24, 2007), demonstrate that Funks could access their Section 22
property from Mellick Road because the Funks never owned the Northeast Quarter of
Section 21 Plaintrff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 3.
After Capstar filed its reply brief on summary judgment, on September 10, 2007,
Lawrences filed yet another brief on summary judgment (in contravention of I.R.C.P.
56(c)), this one entitled "Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff'. In that brief, Lawrences repeat, word for word the brief
Lawrences filed on July 24, 2007, as it pertains to implied easements from prior use.
No request for a jury trial has ever been made in Capstar v. Lawrence.
Accordingly, "When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court
as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the
undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho
354, 360-61, 93 P.3d 685, 691-92 (2004).
In the Capstar case, there is unity of title at the time of the severance of the
dominant and servient estate. The road was in use by the Funks at the time of the
severance and served as their sole access to the Section 21 and Section 22 properties
they retained. Thus, it was reasonably necessary for the beneficial use of the dominant
estate, Funk's Section 22 property at the time of severance. Capstar has met its

C /
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burden of proving there is an implied easement by prior use which is appurtenant to the

property.
C. Easernent by Necessity.

Capstar correctly notes that an easement by necessity has some similar
elements to an easement by prior use. Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 13. The elements are: (1) that the dominant parcel and the
servient parcel were once part of a larger tract under common ownership; (2) that the
necessity for the easement claimed over the servient estate existed at the time of the
severance; and (3) the present necessity for the claimed easement is great. Id., cifing

B&JDevelopment & Inv. Inc. v. Parsons, 126 ldaho 504, 507, 887 P.2d 49, 52 (Ct.App.
1994), MacCaskill v. Ebbed, 112 ldaho 1115, 1118, 739 P.2d 414, 417 (Ct.App. 1987);

Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 ldaho 535, 543, 681 P.2d 1010, 1018 (Ct.App
1984). See also, Bear Island WaferAssfn, Inc. v. Brown, 125 ldaho 717, 725, 874 P.2d
528, 536 (1994). Capstar added little in its Memorandum in Support of Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 13.
There is no dispute that the first element exists.
As to the second and third elements, Lawrences pro se made an argument
unsupported by the law, that because "Funks and [Capstar] don't have a legal
easement to get to the Lawrence property to cross it", necessity does not exist.
Defendants Lawrences Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
p. 18. This argument was noted by the Court in its analysis of an implied easement
from prior use. Since the owner of Section 28 is not a party to this lawsuit, Lawrences'
argument is without merit.
Capstar claims that Kelvin Brownsberger's affidavit contradicts Lawrences' claim
that there is access via Mellick Road based upon a Metsker's map. Plaintiff's Reply

Brlef in Suppofl of Motion for Summary Judgment, p 5 Because Brownsberger does
nottell us in his affidav~twhen he became familiar with Mellick Road, nor does he tell us
when he began working for the Post Falls Highway District Brownsberger cannot

discuss what existed back in 1969 when Funk's purchased or what existed back in
1975 when Funks sold to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor). What is
pertinent is what existed at severance in 1975. The Metsker's map (at the August 7,
2007 hearing on motions to strike, this Court took judicial notice that Metsker maps
have been relied upon for decades, but not as to their accuracy) is not sufficient to
contradict Howard Funk's testimony. The only competent evidence of what existed in
1975 is from Howard Funk. Funk stated: "The private easement road was the only
existing road providing access to the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 and the
Southwest Quarter of Section 22" and when they severed the property in 1975 the sales
agreement referenced that private road and that the Section 21 property being sold to
Human Synergistics, Inc., was being sold subject to an ingress egress easement over
the existing road, and that it was not their intent to landlock the Section 22 property.
Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 3, f[f[ 4, 6.
John Rook corroborates Harold Funk, but does so at a later time in I 9 8 9 when
Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its land. Rook testified in his affidavit that in
1989 the private access road was the only road that provided access to the Funks'
parcels in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22. Affidavit of John Rook in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, f[f[ 4, 6. Finally, John Mack's affidavit makes it
clear that Mellick Road did not provide access to the Funks' parcels in 1992 when Mack
purchased. Affidavit of John Mack in Support of Defendants Lawrences Reply in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 2004.
Lawrences then make the argument that: "Funk obviously had access to his
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other lands when he severed the parcel sold to Hyrnan Synerglstlcs in 1975, otherwise
Funk would have taken great care to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to
Human Synergistics in 1975." Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion
for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 7. The identical argument is made in Opposition
of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 1011. This argument by Lawrences actually cuts against Lawrences quite clearly when
one considers the uncontradicted fact that Funks in their Sale Agreement to Human
Synergistics, Inc., stated that "the Section 21 parcel being sold was subject to an
ingress egress easement over the existing road ori the property that was being sold to
Human Synergistics (Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 3, f[ 6). Just as the Lawrences argue, Funks actually did take great care
to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to Human Synergistics in 1975;
however, they errantly put that language in the Sale Agreement. That is why there is no
express easement. But the reason there is no express easement is perhaps the most
convincing evidence as to the implied easement theories.. . Funks needed to, intended
to, and thought they did reserve an easement across the Human Synergistics land (now
Lawrences land) when they sold to Human Synergistics in 1975. At all times thereafter
Funks used this road as if they had every right in the world to use it. This Court finds
that the second element of easement by necessity exists ...the necessity for the
easement claimed over the servient estate existed at the time of the severance in 1975.
Capstar argues that the third element, present great necessity for the easement,
is supported by the Affidavit of Thomas Mack. Mack's affidavit does indicate Mellick
Road does not pass over Funks' property, and Mack's affidavit indicates that even
Mack had no access to Mellick Road until he made an agreement with Fred Zuber, who
owned to the North of Mack, "whereby I agreed to reconstruct the road leading down

the north face of Blossom Mountain " Mack also testtfied "Over the years, the road had

been completely abandoned" a n d "It did not appear that anyone had used the road for

nearly 20 years

"

Capstar also argues "As demonstrated on the assessor's map

included as Exhibit 'A' to Weeks' Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike Lawrence
Affidavit filed 7124107, Mellick Road as constructed today lies in the Northeast Quarter
and the Southeast Quarter of Section 22", and "Funks never owned either of these
parcels " Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
p. 13; Affidavit of Weeks in Support of Motion to Strike Lawrence Testimony, filed
August 4, 2007, Exhibit A.
This Court finds there is no question of fact as to whether the present necessity
for the claimed easement is great. There is no evidence that Capstar has any other
access other than the Blossom Mountain Road access which is the subject of this
litigation.

D. Easement by Prescription.
An easement by prescription was not raised in Capstar's initial Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 9, 2004, nor did Lawrences
discuss the theory in their pro se Defendants Lawrences Reply in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 2004. Capstar did not raise
the theory in its Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed
April 6, 2004. The first time the issue of a prescriptive easement was raised was in
Capstar's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 1112.
Capstar argues the road was established as early as 1966, and that it is
undisputed that Funks were using the road for access to both their Section 21 and
Section 22 parcels. Id. p. 12. Capstar argues that when Funks sold the Section 21

parcel to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor), Funks included rn the sales

contract language that gave notice that Funks intended to continue to use the road for
ingress and egress to the Section 22 parcel Funks retained. Id. Capstar argues this
language provided notice to others that they were claiming a right to use the road in the
future for ingress and egress to the lands the Funks retained, and that it is undisputed
that Funks and their predecessors (successors) then proceeded to use the road openly,
continuously, without interruption, under a claim of right for the statutory period. Id.
Capstar notes the ldaho Supreme Court in Akers v. D. L. White Construction,
Inc., 142 ldaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196, 206 (2005) held:
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by
prescription "must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the
subject property, which is characterized as: 1) open and notorious; (2)
continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4)
with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient
tenement (5) for the statutory period." (citation omitted). The statutory
period in question is five years. (citations omitted). A claimant may rely
on his own use, or he "may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's
predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine such
predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the requisite
five continuous years of use." (citation omitted). Once the claimant
presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the
use began, he raises the presumption that the use was adverse and
under a claim of right. (citations omitted). The burden then shifts to the
owner of the servient tenement to show that the claimant's use was
permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. (citations
omitted).

Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 11-12.
A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient tenement was by

permission of its owner, because the use, by definition, was not adverse to the rights of
the owner. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 ldaho 474, 480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006).
Lawrences argue that Capstar's use of the land has always been permissive.
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of
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Plaint~ff,p 5 , n 5 Footnote five of Lawrences' brref cites the Court to the "affidavrts of
Daniel Rebor [sic, actually Rebeor] and Douglas Lawrence" to support this claim There
are several Douglas Lawrence affidavits filed in this matter. The Affidavit of Douglas
Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment filed July 24, 2007, indicates
just the opposite, that Capstar's use of the land at least when Lawrences came into
possession of the land, was anything but permissive:
25. Since taking title to the land, I have worked hard to protect my
private property rights from illegal trespass. I have maintained one or
more locks on my gate, placed no trespass signs at various points on the
property, stopped and turned back people who cannot demonstrate a
legal right to use the road, and have actively attempted to engage the
local Sheriffs office on many occasions to get their support. Between
May 2000, and October 2003, 1 have filed over I 0 separate crime reports
with the Kootenai County Sheriffs office for vandalism, trespass,
destruction of personal property, and for leaving my gate open and
unlocked. These Crime Reports are attached and included herein as
Exhibit "I".
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment, filed
July 24, 2007, p. 9 (unnumbered pages), fl 25. Douglas Lawrence's affidavit
contradicts the claim his attorney makes on his behalf. Lawrences' claim that use of
the land has always been permissive flies in the face of the fact that the genesis of this
lawsuit was Lawrences "periodically locked the gate which they placed across the
Blossom Mountain Road in an effort to deny Capstar its right of access over and across
the Blossom Mountain Road." Complaint for Quiet Title and Permanent Injunction, p. 6,

fl XVlV (XIX).
Douglas Lawrence's affidavit claims that prior to 2001, "Capstar's use of the road
as it crosses my land was permissive." Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of
Opposition to Summary Judgment, filed July 24, 2007, p. 14 (unnumbered pages), fl
49, Exhibit M. Douglas Lawrence cites to Capstar's response to Lawrences' Request
for Admission No. 85 which reads: "Please admit that, prior to 2001, Defendants

5 77:

Lawrence drd not use any gate to restrict PlaintiN Capstar's Vehicular access", to whrch

Capstar responded "Adrnrt that the gate has always been on the road since Capstar's
predecessors in title acquired the Capstar parcel was not locked and did not obstruct
erther Capstar or its predecessors in title's access until it was locked by Lawrence." Id.
The fact that the gate is not locked may be evidence of Lawrences' acquiescence of

others, including Capstar, to travel thrs road, it may be evidence of Lawrences'
indifference of others, including Capstar, travelling this road, and it may be evidence of
Lawrences' ignorance of anyone, including Capstar travelling this road, but it is not
evidence that Lawrences or their predecessors gave Capstar or its predecessors
permission to use this road. "Mere inaction and passive acquiescence is not a sufficient
basis for proving that the use of the claimed right was with the permission of the owner of
the servient tenement." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 51 1 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973).
Lawrences claim that "Capstar's use of the land has always been permissive"
ignores the fact that Lawrences did not purchase their property until 1996. Thus, in the
years from 1966 to 1996, they are not competent to testify as to anything that occurred
in that period.
Lawrences cite the affidavit of Daniel Rebor [Rebeor] for their claim that
Capstar's use of the road was permissive. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda
Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 9, n. 5. There is an Affidavit
of Daniel E. Rebeor in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order filed July 22,
2003. A review of Rebeor's affidavit shows he managed the tower site for Capstar, and
that "On November 3, 1997, Nextel West Corp. entered into an "Access License
Agreement" with Douglas and Brenda Lawrence in an effort to avoid litigation regarding
access to a leased parcel upon which it was locating a communications tower ..."
Affidavit of Daniel E. Rebeor, p 2,

nn 2, 3.

On January 13, 2003, Nextel assigned the
-

-.
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Access License Agreement to Capstar Id

4 The uncon"iroverted evidence is the

license was entered into in 1997 "in an effort to avoid litigation" That certainly is not
evidence that there was permissive use of the road at that time. It is evidence of just
the opposite, that Lawrences were claiming Capstar had no right to use the road.
Certainly the assignment of a license would stop the adverse period from running per
the quoted portion of Akers, but the evidence has not been contradicted by Lawrences
that from 1966 to 2003 Capstar and their predecessors used this road under a claim of
right,
Capstar's uncontradicted evidence is as fol'lows: Harold Funk testified in his
affidavit that: "Following the sale [in 19751, we continuously utilized the existing road in
Section 21 to access our property in Section 22 without interference." Affidavit of
Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 9, 2004, p. 4, fl

6 . John Rook testified in his affidavit that when Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc, purchased
its parcel in 1989:
There were other nearby parcels used for towers further east from
the parcel purchased by Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc., including a parcel of
property owned and used by General Telephone Company. At the time
that Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc, purchased its parcels, these property
owners and their tenants were using the road to access their parcels, and
continued to do so after Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its parcel.
Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 9,

The existing private access road was visible and in use by Funks at
the time Kootenai Broadcasting purchased its parcel. I have personally
driven this road and used it on several occasions to access the Kootenai
Broadcasting, Inc. parcel. The private road was the only road that
provided access to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc.'s parcel of property.

Lawrences make several arguments regarding Capstar's predecessor's (the

f i n k s ) ablllty to obtain a prescriptive easement First, Lawrences claim "In 1975. Funk

moved to Aberdeen and then to American Falls, Idaho, where he has resided since
(Funk Deposition, hereinafter 'FD' 28:20 to 28:24.). Opposition of Douglas and Brenda
Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. Lawrences then argue:
"After moving to American Falls, Funk visited his land on Blossom Mountain only two or
three times (FD 30:25 to 31:4)" and "Funk has not visited the Blossom Mountain land
since 1981 (FD 31:17)." Id., p. 5. What Lawrences omit from that same deposition is
the following:
Q. BY MR. WHELAN: Now between the time you bought the property
and the time you sold it to Human Synergistics, how many times did you
go up to the property?
A. Well, we'd always go up andpick huckleberries and stuff, and target
practice and - I don't know. I would have to guess maybe, I don't know,
20, 30 times.
Q. In the two year period, well three years since 1969. I'm sorry. Sixyear period, from 1969 until 1975, about 30 times you were on top of the
mountain?
A. I would suppose, yeah.

Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exhibit A (August 17, 2007 Deposition of Harold Funk), p. 25, LI. 11-23.
Lawrences fail to realize that Funk's use of his property and the use he made of the
Lawrence property in getting to his property from 1975 to the present is not relevant.
The uncontradicted evidence is that Funk used the property consistently for the sixyear period from the day he sold to Human Synergistics to the day he moved from the

area. This is one year more than the five years required for the prescriptive use.
This isn't the type of property of which one would expect daily use. The property is on
top of a mountain. Capstar seeks this easement to maintain its radio equipment on top

of this mountain. The use Capstar seeks is no different than the prescriptive use Funks
made of Lawrences' land for that six-year period from 1969 to 1975.
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E. Lawrences' New Defenses o f Laches and Statute of Limitations.
On September 10, 2007, Lawrences filed therr Motion for Leave to File Amended
Answer, requesting to add the addit~onaldefense of laches This motion to amend was
granted and an order to that eflect was filed on September 26, 2007. Also on
September 10, 2007, Lawrences filed another brief on summary judgment, this one
entitled "Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment
of Plaintif'. In that brief, Lawrences repeat their arguments made in their brief filed July

24, 2007, regarding implied easement by prior use, easement by necessity and
easement by prescription. Lawrences claim additional facts not in dispute. Finally,
Lawrences also added a brief argument on Statute of Limitations and a one paragraph
argument regarding laches. Lawrences also filed on September 10, 2007, an "Affidavit
of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment" and an "Affidavit of John P. Whelan in Support of Defendants' Opposition to
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Leave to Amend." On September 17, 2007, Capstar filed "Plaintiff's
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment".
I)Statute of Limitations.

Lawrences argue ldaho Code Ej 5-203 and 5-204 apply to bar Capstar's claims.
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of
Plaintiff, p. 6. Lawrences provide no legal analysis to support that argument. ldaho
Code Ej 5-203 is not a statue of limitation. It simply sets forth the number of years a
plaintiff in an action must be in possession of the property in question before filing a
lawsuit to adverse possess that property, ldaho Code Ej 5-204 is also not a statute of
limitation, but, simply a statute setting forth the number of years a party must be seized
or be in possession of property following an act of adverse use. It applies to all parties,

not just the plaintiff as in I C
easements, where I C

5 5-203, and it applies to defenses and to prescriptive

5 5-203 only concerns prescriptive possession of property

Lawrences argue "Plaintiffs complarnt makes no reference to its predecessors
interest" Id First, Lawrences completely fail to explaln the legal significance of that
claim There can be no legal basis for thls argument, as both I C § 5-203 and 3 5-204
specifically mention a party's predecessor ldaho case law has long since recognized
this fact that a party's predecessor's use of property or time in possession can be
tacked on to the party's use or time in possession to achieve the requisite number of
years. Akers v. D. L. White Construcfion, lnc , 142 ldaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196, 206

(2005), Hodgins v Sales, 139 ldaho 225, 230, 76 P 3d 969, 975 (2003); State ex re/.
Harnan v. Fox, 100 ldaho 140, 146, 594 P 2d 1093, 1099 (1979); Marshall v. Blair, 130
ldaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). Second, from a factual standpoint,
Lawrences' claim is false. Capstar's Complaint, p. 6, 7 XVll alleges: "Capstar and its
predecessors in title have used the Blossom Mountain Road as it crosses the
Defendants' real property for access to Capstar's real property openly, notoriously,
continuously, adversely and under claim of right for a period exceeding five (5) years."
Lawrences next argue: "Any such rights would necessarily had to have been litigated to
be perfected." Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary
Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 7. Again, there is no explanation as to the legal basis of this
claim Such argument is squarely contradicted by ldaho Code

3 5-203, 5

5-204, and

the analysis of Hodgins, Harnan, Marshall and Akers.

2) Laches.
Lawrences entire argument on laches is as follows:
Whether or not a party is guilty of laches is ordinarily a question of
fact. Osterlich v.Stafe of Idaho, 100 ldaho 702, 604 P.2d 716. It is

beyond y uestlon that the Lawrences have been prejudiced by the alleged
stale claims which PlaintrfT now seeks to enforce If Plaintiff and its
predecessors truly enjoyed easements by implication, necessity andlor by
prescriptive use, those claims should have been perfected through
litigation. The failure to pursue the claims by Plaintiff's predecessors has
clearly prejudiced the ability of the Lawrences and their predecessors to
defend against the claims

Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of
Plaintiff, p. 7. (italics in original). While Lawrences claim it is "beyond question" that
Lawrences have been prejudiced, there is not one fact alleged, not one bit of argument
stating why this is so. Similarly, there is no factual or legal argument made why
Capstar's claims or Capstar's predecessor's "claims should have been perfected
through litigation." The obvious flaw to Lawrences' unsupported argument is prior to
Lawrences purchasing their property and subsequently denying Capstar access, there
was no need to litigate! Every indication is that as soon as Lawrences prohibited

Capstar's access, Capstar took action. Capstar simply is not "guilty of laches."
There is absolutely no merit to either of Lawrences' defenses of statute of
limitations or laches
It. ANALYSIS REGARDING TOWER ASSET SUB, INC. v. LAWRENCE.

A. Facts Pertaining to Tower Asset Sub, Inc., v. Lawrence.
As a preliminary matter, on November 13, 2007, Tower Asset filed a "Motion for
Substitution of Real Party in Interest." The basis for this motion is Tower Asset Sub,
Inc. became Tower Asset Sub, L.L.C., and on February 23,2007, Tower Asset Sub,
L.L.C. merged into Spectra Site, L.L.C., a different Deleware Corporation. Affidavit of
Raymond W. Goodwin in Support of Substitution of Real Party in Interest. This motion
was heard on November 28, 2007, just prior to oral argument on Capstar's summary
judgment motion. At the end of oral argument on the Motion for Substitution of Real
Party in interest, the Court granted the motion and directed counsel for Tower Asset to

5'75

prepare an order No order has been prepared to date S ~ n c eno order has been
and order, the Court will cont~nueto refer to the plaint~ffIn this
entered unt~lt h ~ sdec~s~on
act~onas Tower Asset Sub, inc , (Tower Asset) even though the Court has granted the
rnot~onto substitute Spectra Site, L.L.C., as the real party In interest.
Tower Asset has made ~tclear that ~tIS only seeking ~njunctiverelief in this case,
and that Tower Asset is not making any claim to title over Lawrences' land. Plaintiff's
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1.
Blossom Mountain is located south of Post Falls, Idaho The Lawrences and the
Halls (through whom Tower Asset claims its right) own parcels of property on Blossom
Mountain. Both the Halls' parcel and the Lawrences' parcel (Lawrence parcel) were
once part of a larger tract held under common ownership by Harold and Marlene Funk.
The Lawrence parcel was broken out in 1975 when Funks sold that parcel to Human
Synergistics. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tower Asset Case filed August 17, 2004), p. 2, 7 2.e., Exhibit E. The Halls' parcel was
broken out in 1996 when Funks sold a parcel to Rasmussen. Id., Exhibit Q. The
Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and the Halls' parcel
is located to the east in the southwest quarter of Section 22. Id. Section 21 lies directly
west of Section 22. Id., p. 6, 7 8, Exhibit Z. There is a public road in the area known
as Signal Point Road. Signal Point Road lies generally West of the Lawrence parcel,
which in turn is west of Hall's parcel. Tower Asset, as a tenant of Halls, seeks an
easement to access its equipment located on Halls' property which Tower Asset leases
from the Halls. The easement is located on an unimproved private road commonly
known as Blossom Mountain Road as Blossom Mountain Road crosses through the
Lawrence parcel. In litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition
taken September 30, 2003, recognized the right-of-way easement General Telephone

Corporation (GTC) obtained in July 1966 for access to

GTC s property in Sectlon 22

over the prlvate road that crossed the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences'
parcel) I d , pp. 6-7, TfT 5-7, Exhibit W, X and Y. The detail of the access road
prepared by GTC's engineer in 1967 shows the road leaves Signal Point Road, then
travels southeast through the southwest portion of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then
enters the North Half of Section 28 where it then turned northeast and entered the
southeast quarter of Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y.
Tower Asset asserts that prior to the separation by the Funks of the Lawrences' parcel
from the parent parcel, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had been used by
the Funks as the exclusive means to access their property in Sections 21 and 22.
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (field August 17, 2004), pp.
4-5, 117-9. Tower Asset asserts that even after the separation of Section 21, the
Funks continued to use the private easement road to access their Section 22 parcel.
Id., pp. 5-6, 17 10-11.
Capstar and Tower Asset prove the following chain of title for the parcels
involved in Sections 21 and 22:
1. Reynolds to the Radens and the Marcos (Contract in 1968, Deed in 1974):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and D.
2. Radens and Marcos to Funk (Contract in 1969, Deed in 1974): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed
August 17, 2004), Exhibits B and C.
To this point there was unity of title in the portions of Sections 21 and 22 at issue in this
case.
Capstar and Tower Asset establish the title chain with respect to what became
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the Lawrence property located In the southeast quarter of Section 21 as.

1 Funk to Human Synerglstics (Sale Agreement In 1975, Deed in 1992):
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed November 2, 2004), E and I; Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motlon for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and F; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibit A and F.
2. Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh (Contract and Deed May 16,
1977): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits F and H;
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits F and H.
3. Johnston & McHugh to N.A.P. (Sale Agreement October 6, 1987, Deed July
16, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits G and 0 ;
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits G and 0.
4. N.A.P. to Farmanian (Deeds June 28, 1996 and July 8, 1996)): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits J and K; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibits J and K.

5 Farmanian to Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Sale Agreement July 12,
1996, Deed July 5,1996). ARidav~tof Susan Weeks In Support of Motion for

Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits L,
M, N and P; Affidavit of Susan Weeks In Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Capstar case fifed March 9, 2004), Exh~b~ts
L, M, N and P.
Capstar establ~shesthe title chain with respect to what became the Capstar property in
the southwest corner of Section 22 as:
1. Funk to Kootenai Broadcasting (Deed September 22, 1989): Affidavit of

Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case
filed March 9, 2004), Exhibit Exhibits Q and R.
2. Kootenai Broadcasting to Rook Broadcasting (Deed October 25, 1993):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004) Exhibit S.
3. Rook Broadcasting to AGM (Deed November 20, 1998): Affidavit of Susan
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed
March 9, 2004), Exhibit T.
4. AGM to Capstar (Deed October 25, 2000): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibit U.
Tower Asset establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Hall property in
the southwest corner of Section 22 as:
1. Funk to Rasmussen (Deed August 26, 1996),: Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August
17, 2004), Exhibit Q.
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Rasmussen to VanSky (Deed September 29, 1978) Aff~dav~t
of Susan
Weeks In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case
filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit R

3. VanSky to Switzer Communications. Inc. (Deed December 11, 1981):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit S.
4. Switzer Communications, Inc. to Term Corp. (Deed December 8, 1982):

Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit T.
5. Term Corp. to Mark E. Hall and Robert A. Hall (Deed April 16, 1997);
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit U.
6. Spectra Site was assigned a leasehold interest with Mark Hall and Robert
Hall in a Parcel of property situated in the Southwest quarter of Section
22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Mer4idian, Kootenai
County, Idaho. Affidavit of Dan Rebeor (Tower Asset case filed July 22,
2003).
When the Lawrences questioned Tower Asset's right to access the property it
leases from the Halls over the portion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed
Lawrences', Tower Asset filed suit on June 27, 2003, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. Tower Asset sought to have an easement declared based on four theories:
express easement, easement by implication, easement by necessity, and prescriptive
easement. On Tower Asset's previous motion for summary judgment, this court found
that Tower Asset held an express easement over the Lawrence property based on the
sale agreement, as well as the deed. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment
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and Enter~ngDecree of Qu~etTitle f~ledMay 27, 2005 The Court did not address

Tower Asset's other theortes rarsed In lbs Complaint due to a drscovery issue at the
tlrne Accordingly, Tower Asset and Lawrences in that rnitial motion for summary
judgment did not address theor~esof easement by ~mplicatlon,easement by necessity
and prescr~ptlveeasement. The Lawrences appealed from that decision, and the
Supreme Court reversed summary judgment holding the deed did not create an
express easement over the Lawrence property. On remand, Tower Asset renews its
motion for summary judgment based on the other theories of easement previously
rased In their complaint.
The Lawrence parcel and the Hall parcel were once part of a single tract of land
under the common ownership of Harold and Marlene Funk. In 1975, the Funks divided
their land and sold what is now the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc., while
retaining the southwest quarter of Section 22. Tower Asset asserts that although its
or~ginsare unknown, it is apparent that an easement over the road existed as early as
1966. In litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition taken
September 30, 2003, recognized the right of way easement General Telephone
Corporation (GTC) obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22
over the private road that crossed the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences'
parcel). Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 67,

nn 5-7, Exhibit W, X and Y.

The detail of the access road prepared by GTC's

engineer in 1967 shows the road leaves Signal Point Road, then travels southeast
through the Southwest portion of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then enters the North
Half of Section 28 were it then turned northeast and entered the Southeast quarter of
Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y.
Tower Asset claims that prior to the separation of the Lawrence parcel from the

parent parcel, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had been used by the
Funks as an exclusive means to access their property. That same road was later used
by Hall for access to their segregated parcel in Section 22. Affidavit of Robert Hall in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, 117,8. In 1992, the Funks executed
and delivered a warranty deed conveying the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics.
The warranty deed stated that the deed was given "in fulfillment of those certain
contracts between the parties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the
conveyance of the above described property." In 1996, after a number of other
intermediate conveyances, the Lawrences acquired ownership of their parcel.
The ldaho Supreme Court noted on appeal that Tower Asset had already
established that the Halls (and thus, Tower Asset) were intended to have the right to
use the easement. The ldaho Supreme Court noted in footnote 1 that: "Tower
presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the
benefit of the access road across the Lawrence parcel." Tower Assef Sub, Inc. v.

Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4.
Lawrences also claim Tower Asset has not established that it is Hall's tenant and
that Tower Asset has no standing to seek to quiet title across Lawrences' land.
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of
Plaintiff, pp. 1, 2, 9, 10. A copy of the lease between Nextel Communications and Hall
is included with the Affidavit of Robert Hall. Affidavit of Robert Hall in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 77 3, 4, Exhibit A. Hall received notice that this lease was
assigned to Tower Parent Corp., and Tower Asset Sub, Inc., and that Tower Asset Sub,
Inc. continues to lease the site from us." Id. p. 2, 77 4, 5. Additionally, the Supreme
Court in TowerAsset, Inc., v. Lawrence, supra, noted that: "We hold that Tower, as
lessee of the alleged dominant estate, has standing to seek injunctive relief preventing
,
.
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the Lawrence's from interfering with its right to sue "re easement.!' To~verrlssetSub.
Inc. v. Law[-ence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4. The ldaho Supreme Court also held:

"Tower will have standing to seek injunctive relief if it can establish it has an alleged
legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement." Id. Lawrences'
argument that Tower Asset lacks standing to pursue easement theories of implication
or necessity (Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 6-7) is without merit. Lawrences admit Tower Asset
has standing to prove an easement by prescription. Id., p. 7.
Lawrences qext argue that Wall has no easement by necessity or implication and
thus has nothing to assign to Tower Asset, and that the only theory available to Tower
Asset is easement by prescription. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to
Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 1-3, 8. Tower Asset now argues that
nothing presented by the Lawrences alters the Supreme Court holding that Tower Asset
has standing as a lessee of the dominant estate. Tower Asset correctly .argues "the
only issue remanded by the appellate court in this case was whether Tower
Asset, as a tenant, has a legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road
easement of its landlord, Halls." Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion

for Summary Judgment, p. 2. (emphasis added). This is because the ldaho Supreme
Court noted in Footnote 1 that: "Tower presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall
parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road across the Lawrence
parcel." TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4.
In accordance with 28A C.J.S. Easements Ij 164 (1996), Tower Asset argues
that while a private way may not be used by the general public, it may be used by the
owner of the way, his family, tenants, servants, and guests, as well as by persons

transacting business with hrm, rn the absence of a special agreement to the contrary
Pla~nt~N's
Reply Memorandum in Suppor"rof Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2.
Additionally, Tower Asset asserts that there rs nothing contained in the copy of the
lease between Tower Asset and Hall that demonstrates a special agreement between
Hall and Tower Asset that Tower Asset may not use an easement for which the Halls
have the benefit, Id. at p. 3. Hence, Tower Asset argues they are entitled to injunctive
relief. id.
Lawrences argue that Tower Asset is not t h e Halls' tenant since the Halls and
Tower Asset did not follow the assignment provision of the lease agreement.
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 10. The lease between Nextel and the Halls has a provision that reads:
"Lessee may not assign, or otherwise transfer all or any part of its interest in this
Agreement or in the Premises without the prior written consent of Lessors

...I1

Affidavit

of Robert Hall in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, r( 14. Tower
Asset re-characterizes Lawrences argument a s follows: "Essentially, Lawrences argue
that Hall may not waive a contract clause." Plaintiffs' Supplemental Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. Tower Asset correctly
states that a s long a s the Halls and Tower Asset are in agreement that they share a
tenant/landlord relationship pursuant to the lease, Lawrences may not challenge that
relationship. Id. The uncontroverted evidence by Robert Hall is "...that Tower Asset
Sub, Inc, continues to lease the site from us." Afidavit of Robert Hall in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, r(r(4, 5, Exhibit A. This Court finds the
uncontroverted evidence shows that Hall and Tower Asset are in agreement that they
share a landlord and tenant relationship. As noted by Tower Asset, "No law requires
strict compliance to the terms of the lease agreement if the parties agree to the waiver
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of t h e term

"

Plaintiff's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for

Summary Judgment, p. 3. Obviously, Hall and Nextel either agreed to waive the
assignment term or they simply are not concerned with that provision. There is no
assignment issue at issue here Quite simply, the Lawrences are not in privity to the
leasing agreement between Nextel and the Halls, or the agreement between Nextel's
assignee, Tower Asset, and the Halls. Therefore, Tower Asset is correct in asserting its
right to use the Halls' easement over Lawrences' land. Tower Asset is entitled to
rnjunctive relief.
As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, "Tower presented uncontroverted
evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road
across the Lawrence parcel." Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No.
14, p. 4. Additionally, the analysis above as to Capstar's easement by implication from
prior use, easement by necessity and easement by prescription, applies to the Halls.
The only additional argument made by Lawrences as to an easement by prescription is
that Lawrences argue that Tower Asset itself makes no claim that it has used the
Lawrence parcel openly, notoriously, continuously, and in a hostile manner for the
statutory period. Lawrences' argument continues that since no prescriptive claim has
been established by Tower Asset and since Tower Asset's use of the road has always
been permissive, a prescriptive easement cannot exist. The Court's analysis above
explains why these arguments have no merit. The only additional argument made by
Lawrences as to an implied easement by prior use is Lawrences assert that the parcel
at issue in the Tower Asset case was not created or severed from the Funks' other
lands until 1977 (as opposed to 1975 in the Capstar case) when Funk conveyed the
property to Rasmussen/Chamberlain. Lawrences argue that because there was no
easement in 1975 when the servient estate was severed from the dominant estate, and

therefore no prior use Tower Asset has fa~ledto meet t h e second element af an
implied easement This Court has already explained why there was an easement by
~mplication,from prior use and by prescrrptron rn 1975
As lessee from Halls, Tower Asset is entitled to ~njunctiverelief against
Lawrences as to use of this easement across Lawrences' land for use of this road
known as Signal Point Road.
Just as in the Capstar case, Lawrences in this Tower Asset case also make the
arguments of statute of Itmitations and laches Opposition of Douglas and Brenda
Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 8-9. The analysis
above as to those arguments applies in the Tower Asset case. Lawrences cannot avail
themselves of those defenses for the reasons stated above.

Ill. ORDER.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment filed
by Capsfar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and Renewed Motion for Summary Judmgnet
filed in Tower Assef Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621, are GRANTED. In the

Capstar case, Capstar has proven they have an implied easement by prior use, an
easement by necessity, and an easement by prescription, and Lawrences have failed to
establish a material fact as to any other these theories. In the Capsfar case,
Lawrences have failed to establish a material fact in dispute as to any of these theories.
The defenses of laches and statute of limitations are not available to the Lawrences in
the Capstar case.
In the Tower Asset case, Tower Asset has proven they are entitled to injunctive
relief, as their landlord, the Halls, have an easement over Lawrences land established
by prior use, by necessity and by prescription, and Lawrences have failed to establish a

material fact in d~sputeas to any of these theories The defenses of laches and statute
of l~mitatlonsare not available to the Lawrences In the Tower Asset case
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED in the Tower Asset case, that Tower Asset's motion

to substitute Spectra Site, L.L.C.. as the real party in interest is GRANTED.

Entered this 6'h day of February, 2008.

Certificate o f Service

I certify that on the
day of February, 2008, a true copy of the foregoing was mailed
postage prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail or facsrmile to each of the following:
Lawyer

John P. Whelan

Fax #

208 664-2240

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.
2 1 3 N. 4thStreet
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. CV-02-7671
VS.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

I

TO: The above-named Plaintiff, Capstar Radio Operating Company, and
its attorney, Susan P. Weeks, and t o the Clerk o f the above-entitled Court:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J.
Lawrence, appeal t o the Idaho Supreme Court f r o m orders entered in the aboveentitled action by The Honorable John T. Mitchell presiding.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

2.
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motion to
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all briefs and affidavits in support.
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1 hereby certify:
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Court for a determination of the estimated fee for the transcript cost.
(c)

Said fee will be paid upon determination o f the appropriate

(d)

Service has been made on all parties required t o be served

amount.
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hearing(s) required to be prepared for purposes of this Appeal.
IT FURTHER IS ORDER that Appellant shall serve the Reporter(s) with a copy
of the Amended Notice of Appeal and shall indicate in the Amended Notice of Appeal whlch
reporter(s) was served.

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED the Amended Notice of Appeal shall be filed with
the District Court within fourteen (14) days from the date of thls Order. In the event an
Amended Notice of Appeal is not filed, this appeal may proceed on the Clerk's Record ONLY.
DATED this 27thday of March 2008.
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In the Supreme Court of the Stat~~skt;M*q,02

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY, )
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ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and
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Defendants-Appellants.
A Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record was filed October 21, 2005 in appeal
No. 32090, Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence, therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record in this case shall be

.

AUGMENTED to include the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal
No. 32090.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a
LlMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in
the Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document
included in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 32090.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare and
lodge a SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT with the District Court, whch shall
contain the proceedings requested in the Notice of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any
proceedings included in the Reporter's Transcnpt filed in prior appeal No. 32090. Further, the
exhibits submitted in prior appeal No. 32090, which were returned to District Court on March
I

23, 2007, are not covered by this Order and they will not be sent to the Supreme Court unless
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CASE NO. CV-02-7671

I

VS.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife,

Defendants.

I

TO: The above-named Plaintiff, Capstar Radio Operating Company, and
i t s attorney, Susan P. Weeks, and to the Clerk of the above-entitled Court:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J.
Lawrence, appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from orders entered in the aboveentitled action by The Honorable John T. Mitchell presiding.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, and
the Orders described in paragraph one ( 1 ) above are appealable Orders under
and pursuant to Rule 1 1 (a) of the ldaho Appellate Rules.

3.

Several primaryordersareappealed in this appeal, including the
February 6, 2008 order granting Plaintiff's renewed motion for summary
judgment, together with the trial court order denying Defendants renewed
motion for disqualification for cause.

The primary issues presented by this appeal include, but are not
limited to, the following:
4.

(a)

Was it an abuse of discretion to permit Capstar to substitute
Spectracite as the real party in interest?

(b)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself
for cause?

(c)

In granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, are the
findings of the trial court supported by substantial and competent
evidence?

(d)

Did the trial court abuse i t s discretion by granting Plaintiff
prejudgment access to Defendants land without first requiring a
bond or undertaking?

(e)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Defendants only
two weeks to complete their discovery?

(f)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting Plaintiff's
affidavits in their entirety over Defendants' objections?

(g)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding Defendants'
affidavits?
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5.

A reporter's transcript has been requested and the required
(a)
fees will be paid on determination of an estimated cost.

(b)

The Defendants request the preparation of the following
transcripts of hearings before the Court from Court Reporter, Julie Foland:
-

June 13, 2007:

Hearing re:

Renewed Motion

for Summary Judgment; Motion
for Enlargement of Time;
Application
for
Order
Shortening Time; Motion for
Disqualification for Cause;
Motion to Strike Portions of
Affidavit Douglas Lawrence;
Motion to Strike Affidavit of
John Mack
-

August 6, 2007:

Hearing
re:
Motion for
Reconsideration; Motion for
Permission to Appeal from an
Interlocutory order

-

August 7, 2007:

Hearing
re:
Motion for
Summary Judgment; Motion for
Enlargement of Time; Motion
to strike; Request for Judicial
Notice; Motion to Strike All
Whelan's Motions

-

October 31, 2007:

Hearing Re: Motion to Shorten
Time and Application for Sixth
Access

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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-

November 27, 2007:

Hearing re: Renewed Motion
for Disqualification for Cause;
Motion to Substitute Real Party
in Interest; Renewed Motion to
Appeal from an Interlocutory
Order; Motion t o Continue Trial

6.
The Defendants request that the Clerk's record include the
documents specified in subsection (b)(l) of Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules
as well as the following documents:
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and renewed motion for
(a)
summary judgment all affidavits submitted in support of the motion.
Defendants' briefs in opposition to the various motions for summary
(b)
judgment and all affidavits offered by Defendants in support of the opposition
to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
(c)
Defendants' renewed motion to disqualify for
supporting briefs and affidavits.

cause and all

(d)
Defendants' original
supporting briefs and affidavits.

cause and all

motion to disqualify for

(e)
Defendants' motion for enlargement of time and the briefs and
affidavits in support.
Plaintiff's motion to substitute real party in interest, together with
all briefs and affidavits in support.
(f)

Defendants' opposition to Plaintiff's motion to substitute real party
(g)
in interest together with all briefs and affidavits in support of the opposition.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4

7.
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District Court that are, in whole or part, the subject of the instant appeal.
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(a.) The original Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Defendants
Lawrences9eply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
March 23, 2004, filed March 23, 2004 in Case CV-02-7671.
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Clerk of the District Court.
That a request has been made with the Clerk of the District
(b)
Court for a determination of the estimated fee for the transcript cost.
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Said fee will be paid upon determination of the appropriate

amount,
Service has been made on all parties required to be served
(d)
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

DATED this

day of April, 2008.
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

John P. Whelan
Attorney for Defendants
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James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1626 Lincoln Way
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4 U . S . Mail, postage prepaid
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684
Personally served

Julie Foland
Court Reporter
324 West Garden Ave.
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur dlAlene, ID 8381 6-9000

Via:
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John P. Whelan
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,
PlaintifflRespondent,

vs

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
)

1
1
1
1

DOUGLAS P LAWRENCE and
BRENDA J LAWRENCE,
Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF
EXHIBIT
CIVIL CASE NO.
CVO2-767 1

I, DANIEL J. ENGLISH, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the attached list
of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being forwarded to the Supreme
Court of Appeals.
I FURTHER CERTIFY that the following documents will be submitted as exhibits to the
record:
1. Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Defendant Lawrence's Reply
in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court
at Kootenai County, Idaho this j 3 day of 3AA
,2Om
Daniel J English
Clerk of District Court
By:

.

,

In the Supreme Coud o f the State o f Idaho
GAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE W C O R D

1
v.
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and
wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 35 120-2008
Kootenai County Docket No. 2002-7671

1
1
1
1

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEMOF was filed by counsel for Respondent on May 8,2009. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT H E M B Y IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed
below, file stamped copies of which accon~paniedthis Motion, as EXHIBITS:

I. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped
March 9,2004; and
2. Affidavit of Kelvin Brownsberger, file-stamped April 6,2004.
DATED this

h

of May 2009.
For the Supreme Court

cc: Counsel of Record

IN THE S U P P E M E COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

1
GAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation

1
1
)

PlaintiffIRespondent,

1
1

VS

DOUGLAS P. LAWWNCE and
BRENDA J. LAWMNCE, husband and
wife,
DefendantIAppellant,

SUPREME COURT NO.
35 120

1
1
1
1

1

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is
a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho
Appellate Rules.
I further certify that exhibits were offered in this case.

I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the
Clerk's Record was complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town,
the copies were mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid. on theI

,

day of

I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with t l ~ eClerk of the
Supreme Court.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at
-

Kootenai County, Idaho this

-3"-{

day

i

.

i

,2008.
\

'

DANIEL J. ENGLISH
Clerk of the District Court
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I

- J

Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
CAPSTAR RADIO OPEMTING
COMPANY, a Delaware coqoration
SUPREME COURT NO.
35120
DOUGLAS P. LAWEWNCE and
BRENDA J. LAWRENCE, husband and
wife,
Defendant/Appellant,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the
Attorneys of record in this cause as follows:

JOHN P WHELAN
2 13 N 4thStreet
Coeur d3AleneID 838 14

SUSAN WEEKS
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' Alene ID 838 14

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
said Court this '
day of
,2008.
Daniel J. English
Clerk of the District Court

